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CHOICE OF LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT: RICHARDS AND RENVOI
REVISITED
JAMES A. SHAPIRO*
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) authorizes negligence
actions against the United States Government but requires that
the applicable law come from the state where the negligence oc-
curred. Thirty years ago, in Richards v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law in-
cludes not only the state's substantive law, but also its choice of
law rules. The result may be that a court will apply the substan-
tive law of a state where the negligence did not occur.
In this Article, James Shapiro finds that three decades of
decisions adhering to Richards have produced a body of case law
that is unnecessarily complicated and inconsistent with congres-
sional intent. Mr. Shapiro also argues that too often plaintiffs
receive disproportionately large recoveries because of the Rich-
ards approach.
Mr. Shapiro recommends that the FTCA's language desig-
nating the applicable law to be "the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred" be reinterpreted or amended so that
the applicable law is limited to only the state's substantive law.
Such an interpretation would deny federal courts the opportunity
to manipulate the FTCA to reach a desired result and would
subject the United States to liability as Congress originally
intended.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is a limited waiver of sover-
eign immunity in tort actions against the United States Government.'
One of the many limitations on this waiver is that the liability of the
United States be determined "in accordance with the law of the place
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College; J.D. 1985, William and Mary. The views expressed in this Article are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the United States Department of Justice or any office of the
United States Attorney.
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the Northern District of Illinois, for inspiring this Article by trying (and winning) a case in
which the issue arose.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976).
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where the act or omission occurred."2 At first, many courts understand-
ably assumed this language meant what it seems to mean on its face: that
the FTCA automatically applies3 the substantive tort law of the state4
where the negligence occurred.' Thirty years ago, however, in Richards
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
3. See, eg., Voytas v. United States, 256 F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1958) (applying substan-
tive tort law of Virginia, where Government was allegedly negligent in storing explosives, to
issue of Government's duty, although explosion occurred in Illinois and Virginia would have
chosen Illinois law had its lex loci delicti choice of law rule been applied); Eastern Air Lines v.
Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 80-81 (D.C. Cir.) (divided court holding that Virginia rather
than District of Columbia law applied to airplane crash in District of Columbia because Gov-
ernment's negligence occurred in Virginia flight tower), cert. denied in part, aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 350 U.S. 907, 911 (1955); cf Richards v. United States, 285 F.2d 521, 526 (10th Cir.
1960) (Murrah, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that FTCA provides its own conflicts rule: law of
place of negligence), aff'd on grounds opposite to dissent, 369 U.S. 1 (1962); United States v.
Marshall, 230 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1956) (applying Idaho law to Government's liability
because Government's negligence in Utah had operative effect in Idaho). But see Hess v.
United States, 259 F.2d 285, 291 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding that law of place includes its conflicts
rules, as in diversity cases, because statutory words are broad enough to include such rules and
they are not excepted in FTCA), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); Landon v.
United States, 197 F.2d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1952) (applying conflicts rule of New York, where
negligence occurred, to determine that New Jersey's rule on reimbursement from claims
against third parties controlled).
4. Despite the statute's use of the term "place," many courts substitute "state" in dis-
cussing choice of law under the FTCA. See, eg., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 5, 8,
11 (1962). This substitution is accurate insofar as foreign countries are "places," because for-
eign law is supposed to be inapplicable under the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988)
(exempting from jurisdiction "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country"); United States v. Spe-
lar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949) (finding Congress unwilling to subject United States to liability
based on law of foreign power). For a more in-depth discussion of the foreign country exclu-
sion, see 2 LESTER S. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 263 (1989). But see
infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (suggesting whole law of place where negligence
occurs might choose law of foreign country, in contravention of foreign country exclusion).
One court has defined "place" in the context of the FTCA as "the political entity in which
the tortious act occurred." Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 518, 524
(E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd on other grounds, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Hess v. United
States, 361 U.S. 314, 318 n.7 (1960) (holding that "term 'place' in the [FTCA] means the
political entity ... whose laws shall govern the action against the United States 'in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances'" (quoting
federal tort claims procedure in 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988))). Another court has distinguished
"law of the place" from "law of the state" for the purpose of suggesting that the law of a place
could be federal rather than state law. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States, 462 F.
Supp. 1193, 1213 (E.D. Cal. 1978); accord Caban v. United States, 728 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir.
1984).
Although many governmental acts or omissions occur in American political entities such
as the District of Columbia and United States territories, which are "places" but not "states,"
this Article uses those terms interchangeably in recognition of common usage by the courts
and the fact that most FTCA cases apply the law of one of the 50 states. See Southern Pac.,
462 F. Supp. at 1213 ("In the vast majority of FTCA cases, [the] law [of the place] will, in fact,
be the law of [the] state.").
5. The Supreme Court has unequivocally and quite defensibly interpreted "the place
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v. United States,6 the United States Supreme Court held that "the law" of
the state where the negligence occurred is the "whole" law of that state-
both the state's substantive law and its choice of law rules-rather than
simply the state's "internal" or substantive law.7 Consequently, the sub-
stantive tort law to be applied in an FrCA case might not be that of the
state in which the negligence occurred, as many courts had assumed
based on the apparent meaning of the statutory language,8 but rather the
law of some other state chosen by the choice of law rules of the state
where the negligence occurred.9 This approach in choice of law cases has
where the act or omission occurred" to mean the place of negligence, not the place of injury.
Richards, 369 U.S. at 9.
6. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
7. Id. at 11.
8. Even after the Supreme Court unequivocally interpreted the statutory language to
refer to the whole law rather than the internal law of the place where the negligence occurred,
some courts ignored this precedent-presumably by mistake-and continued to apply internal
law, apparently not considering the statute's susceptibility to another construction. See, e.g.,
Bannon v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (D.R.I. 1968) (applying substantive law of
Massachusetts, where Government's alleged medical malpractice occurred, without applying
Massachusetts's lex loci delicti rule, which would have referred court to law of Rhode Island,
where death occurred); McSwain v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 386, 388 & nn.2-3 (E.D. Pa.
1968) (applying Colorado's substantive law of respondeat superior and interspousal immunity
without choice of law analysis, although all parties to accident in Colorado were Pennsylvania
domiciliaries, and Colorado had never formally adopted lex loci delicti or any other choice of
law rule for tort cases until First National Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 442-44, 514 P.2d
314, 316-18 (1973), in which the state supreme court rejected lex loci delicti); cf Bell Helicop-
ter v. United States, 833 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that
Richards mandates application of Alaskan whole law to contribution claim against Govern-
ment under Federal Employees Compensation Act); Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. United
States, 622 F. Supp. 443, 446 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (acknowledging plaintiff's argument that
California confficts rules should apply, but choosing California internal law without meaning-
ful choice of law analysis); Sawyer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 324, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1969)
(expressly acknowledging applicability of whole law of state where negligence occurred, but
applying New York's substantive law without choice of law analysis, even though case in-
volved plane crash with multistate contacts), aff'd on other grounds, 436 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
1971); Mills v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 972, 974 (D.D.C. 1969) (acknowledging and apply-
ing Richards, but interpreting "law of the place where the act or omission occurred" to be
"substantive law of the state where the injuries were sustained," thereby contradicting not only
the Supreme Court's whole law ruling, but also its holding that applicable law is where negli-
gence, not injury, occurs); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, 267 F. Supp. 298, 302 (D. Md. 1967)
(acknowledging Richards, but "[a]s the accident occurred in Maryland," applying Maryland's
whole law to collateral estoppel issue when negligence occurred at Washington Air Route
Traffic Control Center in Virginia).
9. See, e.g., Guillory v. United States, 699 F.2d 781, 784-87 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying
Louisiana law under choice of law rules of Texas, where negligence occurred); Loge v. United
States, 662 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Arkansas law under District of Colum-
bia's choice of law rules), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982); Tyminski v. United States, 481
F.2d 257, 265-68 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying New Jersey law under New York's choice of law
rules); Hensley v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 716, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (applying Florida law
under New York's choice of law rules); Reminga v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 445, 457-59
(W.D. Mich. 1978) (applying Michigan law under Wisconsin's choice of law rules), aff'd on
644. NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
often been referred to as "renvoi."'
For three decades, the Supreme Court's surprising renvoi approach
has heavily influenced multistate tort litigation-not only under the
FTCA, but also under other federal acts concerning tort liabil-
other grounds, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980); Merchants Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 272 F. Supp. 409, 419 (D.N.D. 1967) (applying North Dakota law under choice of law
rules imputed to South Dakota by North Dakota district court).
10. Note, Choice-of-Laws Rule Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 10 UCLA L. Rv.
681, 686 (1963); see LEA BRILMEYER & JAMES MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 300 n.2 (3d ed. 1990). The French word "renvoi" (pronounced rohn-vwah' in
French but often anglicized to ron'-voy or ren'-voy) means "echo." WEBSTER'S THmIRD IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1923 (3d ed. 1971). American jurisprudence adopted the word
for its rich connotation of a forum state's reference to another state's whole rather than inter-
nal law, which causes the choice of law to "bounce back," like an echo off a wall, to the law of
the forum state (called "remission"), with which it is presumably more familiar, or to that of a
third state (called "transmission"), which it may be more comfortable in applying. See gener-
ally EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.13 (1982) (providing an
overview of renvoi and its application).
Note that the statutory renvoi applied in Richards is a little different from the common-
law renvoi applied by one state to refer to the whole law of another. Under Richards, the
FTCA, as the Supreme Court construed it, starts the renvoi, and refers to the whole law of the
state where the negligence occurred. Under the common law, the forum court-as opposed to
a statute-starts the renvoi by referring to the whole law of the state to which it is directed by
the forum's choice of law rules. This distinction may well be outcome-determinative in FTCA
cases if the forum's choice of law rules differ from those of the place where the negligence
occurred, and if the differing choice of law rules ultimately refer to conflicting laws of different
states. For a brief discussion of the predominant choice of law approaches, see infra notes 33-
34.
11. See cases cited supra note 9. The modem choice of law approaches, primarily govern-
mental interest analysis and the Second Restatement of Conflicts' "most significant relation-
ship" test, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148 (1971), make choice of law
under the FTCA especially critical because the United States, the only possible FTCA defend-
ant, has no domicile for choice of law purposes. See O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d
842, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1984) ("United States... is neither incorporated nor domiciled in any
one state."); see also Foster v. United States, 768 F.2d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1985) ("United
States is obviously a domiciliary of neither" Florida nor Illinois.); Donaldson v. United States,
634 F. Supp. 735, 739 (S.D. Fla. 1986) ("United States conducts its activities in all of the fifty
states and cannot be said to have any greater contact with Arizona than it does with Flor-
ida."). But see Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (analogizing
Government to national corporation headquartered in District of Columbia, which "would
have some interest in having its law applied to decide the liability of a business headquartered
there"). The lack of a one-state domicile for the United States places increased weight on the
plaintiff's domicile and other factors in any modem choice of law analysis. See, e.g., Foster,
768 F.2d at 1283 (holding that Florida had no interest in protecting nondomiciliary defendant
like United States with its limitation on wrongful death recovery); Dohialdson, 634 F. Supp. at
740 (finding that because United States was not domiciled in either Florida or Arizona, Florida
domicile of most plaintiffs and their decedents' estates took on greater importance); Reminga
v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 445, 458 (W.D. Mich. 1978) ("Application of Michigan law as
to the amount of damages plaintiffs may recover would injure no important Wisconsin aero-
nautical safety policy," because Wisconsin would be indifferent to limiting the exposure of a
nondomiciliary like the United States.), aff'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980).
The traditional lex loci delicti approach takes discretion away from the federal court be-
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ity."2 The impact under the FTCA has been especially strong in aviation
cases like Richards, in which the United States is often a defendant due
to its employment of air traffic controllers, and in which choice of law
issues are rife because of the multistate and multinational nature of avia-
tion. 3 More often than not, Richards's effect has been adverse to the
United States, because the lower federal courts have often used the
Supreme Court's flexible choice of law rule to choose the law of a state
that affords plaintiffs a larger recovery than would be had under another
state's law.14  Moreover, Richards is internally inconsistent, 15 contra-
venes congressional intent,'6 and potentially conflicts with another
FTCA provision, the foreign country exclusion. 7 Many may argue that
Richards should not be overturned because it is a thirty-year-old prece-
dent that the lower federal courts have followed without serious ques-
cause it holds that the choice of law should automatically be the place of injury, absent a
public policy or other exception to the rule. See, eg., Springer v. United States, 641 F. Supp.
913, 934 (D.S.C. 1986) (applying law of South Carolina, where plane crash took place, even
though negligence occurred in North Carolina and Maryland, both of which employed lex loci
delicti); Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 780, 782 (D. Conn. 1981) (applying Virginia's
lex loci delicti rule to select West Virginia's limitation on damages); Griffin v. United States,
351 F. Supp. 10, 33-34 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (choosing Pennsylvania law under lex loci delicti rule of
Maryland, where Government's negligence occurred). Thus, any time the Government's neg-
ligence occurs in a lex loci delicti state, the applicable law will normally be that of the place
where the plaintiff was injured, whether or not that place is different from the one where the
negligence occurred. See infra note 32.
12. See, eg., Burgio v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 865, 868-69 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (using Richards to analogize FTCA to Federal Reservations Act (FRA), 16 U.S.C.
§ 457 (1988), and to justify application of whole law of state surrounding federal enclave). But
see Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China, 923 F.2d
957, 959 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting analogy between FTCA and Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988), primarily on the ground that FSIA lacked FTCA's
"'law of the place where the act or omission occurred"' provision (quoting the FTCA lan-
guage, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)); Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1002-03
(9th Cir. 1987) (same); Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 425 F. Supp. 81, 86 (D. Conn.
1977) (rejecting analogy between FTCA and FRA based on FRA's legislative history).
13. See, eg., Hensley v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 716, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (choosing
Florida law under New York's interest analysis although plane was under guidance of New
York Air Traffic Control Center at time of crash); Springer, 641 F. Supp. at 934 (concluding
that when negligence occurred in both North Carolina and Maryland, but both states em-
ployed lex loci delicti, the applicable law was that of South Carolina, where plane crash oc-
curred); Halstead, 535 F. Supp. at 781 (holding that, under Richards analysis, West Virginia's
limited recovery for wrongful death rather than Virginia's unlimited recovery applied to plane
crash in West Virginia, although FAA's negligence occurred in Virginia); Reminga, 448 F.
Supp. at 457-59 (applying Professor Leflar's "choice-influencing factors" adopted by Wiscon-
sin, where Government negligently left television tower guy-wire standing, and choosing law of
Michigan, domicile of plaintiffs' decedents and origin and destination of ill-fated flight).
14. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
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tioning. But if Justice Brandeis in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins18 could
"abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century"19 as
Swift v. Tyson,20 then likewise no reason exists to perpetuate a thirty-
year-old precedent simply because it has been the rule of law for so long.
This Article first examines Chief Justice Warren's analysis in Rich-
ards, discussing its internal inconsistencies as well as its contravention of
congressional intent. It then examines how the lower courts have almost
uniformly applied Richards over the past thirty years to benefit plaintiffs
in FTCA cases. Next, the Article explores a "double choice of law"
problem that Richards creates when the Government's negligence occurs
in more than one state. Finally, the Article argues that the "law of the
place where the act or omission occurred" should be reinterpreted-or
recodified-to mean internal law rather than whole law, in accordance
with Congress's intent when it enacted the FTCA.
I. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN RICHARDS V UNITED STATES
Richards v. United States2" was a wrongful death case brought
against the United States on behalf of passengers killed when their air-
plane crashed in Missouri en route to New York after taking off from
Oklahoma. At the time the passengers' relatives filed the action, Mis-
souri limited all wrongful death plaintiffs to a $15,000 recovery.22
Oklahoma had no such limitation.23 The relatives sued the United States
in federal district court in Oklahoma under the FTCA, claiming that
employees of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)24 negligently
permitted American Airlines to place an unsafe cylinder in one of the
airplane's engines at American's depot in Tulsa, Oklahoma.2 Because
they alleged the FAA's negligence occurred in Oklahoma, the relatives
hoped to have the district court apply Oklahoma's wrongful death stat-
ute as "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred"26 and
18. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19. Id. at 77.
20. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
21. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
22. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1949) (current version codified at § 537.090 (1978)).
23. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1051-1054 (1951) (current version codified at tit. 12, §§ 1051-
1054 (1988)).
24. The Court refered to the FAA as the "Civil Aviation Agency," although the agency
was called the Federal Aviation Agency at the time. The agency was later renamed the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, its current designation, in Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931
(1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(1) (1988)).
25. Richards v. United States, 285 F.2d 521, 523 (10th Cir. 1961), aff'd, 369 U.S. I
(1962).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
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thereby to gain the benefit of Oklahoma's unlimited recovery for wrong-
ful death. The district court, however, dismissed the case,27 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed on the
ground that the Oklahoma wrongful death statute did not have extrater-
ritorial effect, and thus could not apply to deaths that occurred in Mis-
souri rather than Oklahoma.28 Chief Judge Murrah of the Tenth Circuit
dissented on the ground that Oklahoma internal rather than whole law
applied under the FTCA, and that therefore the Oklahoma wrongful
death statute also applied.29
The Supreme Court also affirmed, but on the ground that the whole
law rather than internal law applied, precisely the converse of the dis-
senting opinion in the Tenth Circuit.30 Chief Justice Warren set forth
three reasons for the Court's holding. First, applying the whole law,
rather than internal law, of the place where the negligence occured is
more consistent with treating the United States as a private defendant, as
another provision of the FTCA mandates.31 This is because a private
defendant would always be subject to conflicts rules in a lawsuit with
multistate aspects, although they would be the conflicts rules of the fo-
rum, not those of the place of negligence, unless those places happened to
be one and the same.32 Second, the Court wanted to give impetus to
what was then a burgeoning trend away from the traditional lex loci
delicti rule33 in favor of more modern choice of law analyses.34 The
27. Richards, 285 F.2d at 523. The district court opinion is unreported. See Recent Case,
15 VAND. L. Rv. 1322, 1322 n.4 (1962). Presumably, the district court concluded that the
Oklahoma wrongful death statute was inapplicable and dismissed the case because third-party
defendant American Airlines had already paid or tendered to the plaintiffs $15,000, the maxi-
mum recovery under the Missouri wrongful death statute that ultimately applied in the case.
28. Richards, 285 F.2d at 524-26. The majority opinion briefly discusses the choice of law
issue and seems to adopt the internal law construction of § 1346(b), but does not rely on it in
its holding. Id. at 524-25.
29. Id. at 526 (Murrah, C.J., dissenting).
30. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
31. Id. at 11-12 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958)).
32. See infra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
33. Lex loci delicti means law of the place of the wrong. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 911
(6th ed. 1990). The First Restatement of Conflicts defines the place of the wrong as the place
where the last act necessary to make the actor liable takes place. RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICTS OF LAW § 377 (1934). The last act necessary to make the actor liable is injury to the
plaintiff. Cf W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30,
at 165 (5th ed. 1984) (listing damages as last element of cause of action for negligence and
noting that statute of limitations generally held not to run until damage has occurred, sug-
gesting cause of action does not accrue until plaintiff is injured).
34. Richards, 369 U.S. at 12-13. Today, there are primarily two approaches: governmen-
tal interest analysis and the "most significant relationship" test of § 6 of the Second Restate-
ment. Governmental interest analysis compares the policies behind the laws of each of the
states with any relationship to the case, and chooses the law of the state whose policy would
1992]
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whole law rule would accomplish this by allowing the federal courts to
apply the modern conflicts approaches when states in which the United
States is negligent have adopted them.35 Third, Congress did not clearly
express its intent to have the internal law of the place of the act or omis-
sion govern.36 Of these three reasons, only the second is arguably com-
pelling, and even that reason was undermined by the Court's very
holding in Richards.
A. The United States as Private Defendant
Section 2674 of the FTCA mandates that "[t]he United States shall
be liable ... in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances. '3 7 Reading this provision together
with the provision of section 1346(b) that liability be determined accord-
ing to" 'the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,' P38 the
best be furthered by applying that state's law. See generally Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law
in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1047-48 (1987) (providing an overview of gov-
ernmental interest analysis and surveying different choice of law rules). One variation of gov-
ernmental interest analysis is called "comparative impairment," in which the forum court
applies the law of the state whose policy would be most damaged by choosing the law of
another state. The Second Restatement's "most significant relationship" test applies several
discrete factors, which vary according to the type of case, to certain general choice of law
principles, which remain constant for every type of case. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 148 (1971). For tort cases, the discrete factors are (1) place of injury,
(2) place of conduct causing the injury, (3) domicile of the parties, and (4) center of the par-
ties' relationship. Id. The general choice of law principles include the needs of the interstate
system; the policies and relative interests of interested states, including the forum state; cer-
tainty; and ease of application. Id. § 6.
35. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
36. Richards, 369 U.S. at 13-14.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988). Compare id. (FTCA provision) with 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (simi-
lar provision in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)). In Barkanic v. General Admin. of
Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China, 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit used language from § 1606 of the FSIA materi-
ally identical to that of § 2674 of the FTCA to apply the choice of law rules of the forum state.
Id. at 959-60. In doing so, the Second Circuit rejected analogizing to the FTCA because of the
absence of any provision in the FSIA akin to the FTCA's "'law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.'" Jd. at 959 (quoting § 2674 and citing § 1606).
38. Richards, 369 U.S. at 6 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). It is not altogether clear why
the Court even had to read § 1346(b) in conjunction with § 2674. The context of the language
from § 1346(b) is that the Government will be liable "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the
"private individual" provision of § 2674 seems superfluous to the "private person" clause of
§ 1346(b). See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. But see Caban v. United States, 728
F.2d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1984) (arguing that "under like circumstances" modification of "pri-
vate individual" provision in § 2674 distinguishes it from "private person" clause in
§ 1346(b)); cf id. at 76-77 (Cardamone, J., concurring in the result) (rejecting the "like cir-
cumstances" argument in favor of a Supremacy Clause analysis).
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Richards Court reasoned that "where the forum State is the same as the
one in which the act or omission occurred, our interpretation will enable
the federal courts to treat the United States as an individual would be
treated under like circumstances."39 In other words, because "an indi-
vidual... under like circumstances" would be subject to conflicts rules,
the United States should be too. But what if the forum state is not the
same as the one in which the act or omission occurred?' Under Rich-
ards, that situation would result in the following non sequitur: Because a
private defendant would be subject to the choice of law rules of the forum
in which a plaintiff brought an action against him,41 the United States
should be subject to the choice of law rules of the place where the act or
omission occurred. Such a result is not treating the United States as a
private individual would be treated under like circumstances.42
In a footnote, Chief Justice Warren somewhat obliquely acknowl-
edged this problem without fully addressing it.43 He used a hypothetical
twist on the procedural posture of Richards in an attempt to illustrate
how the United States would be treated like a private individual under
his renvoi approach. 4 The Chief Justice supposed the plaintiffs had di-
rectly sued American Airlines, a third-party defendant in Richards, in
39. Richards, 369 U.S. at 12; see Note, supra note 10, at 687 n.36. The significance to the
Court of the forum state being the same as the state in which the negligence occurred lies in
the fact that the forum state's choice of law rules always govern a private defendant for state
law questions under diversity jurisdiction. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941).
40. In Richards, for example, what if an FAA flight tower in Missouri had sent an errone-
ous radio transmission to the airplane while it was still over Oklahoma, resulting in a crash in
Oklahoma? Cf Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 80 (D.C. Cir.) (holding
that FAA's negligence occurred in Virginia flight tower even though crash occurred in District
of Columbia), cerL denied in part, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 350 U.S. 907, 911 (1955). The
negligent act then would have occurred in Missouri, warranting the Oklahoma district court to
apply Missouri's whole law under the Supreme Court's analysis in Richards. At the time,
Missouri, like Oklahoma, followed the lex loci delicti rule, whereby the situs of the last act
necessary to make the United States liable, the hypothetical crash in Oklahoma, determined
the applicable law. Gaston v. Wabash R.R., 322 S.W.2d 865, 866-67 (Mo. 1959), effectively
overruled by Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 184 (Mo. 1969) (abandoning lex loci delicti in
favor of the "most significant relationship" test from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws). Thus, under Gaston, which was still good law at the time of the crash, and the Supreme
Court's approach in Richards, Oklahoma law (and its unlimited recovery for wrongful death)
would have been applicable to the hypothetical.
41. See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
42. Accord Note, supra note 10, at 687 ("[]f the state of the negligent act has adopted a
'contacts' theory of conflicts while the forum state follows the [First] Restatement position, the
government may not incur liability under the same law as that applicable to a private
codefendant.")
43. See Richards, 369 U.S. at 12 n.25.
44. See id.
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Oklahoma.45 If the Court had applied Oklahoma's internal law in the
FTCA suit against the United States, then the United States would have
been treated differently from private defendant American Airlines, to
whom Oklahoma whole law-and thus, because of Oklahoma's lex loci
delicti rule, Missouri internal law-would have applied.46 Under the
Court's whole law approach, however, the United States and American
Airlines would have been treated identically in the hypothetical, because
the United States would also have been governed by Oklahoma's whole
rather than internal law.4 7
But then the Chief Justice conceded that because the FTCA's venue
provision allows suit to be brought wherever the plaintiffs reside as well
as where the negligence occurs, "a situation may arise where a District
Court could not determine the Government's and a private individual's
liability in exactly the same manner.",48 That precise situation would
have arisen in Richards had any of the plaintiffs resided and sued in a
state like New York-the destination of the ill-fated flight-which had
retreated from the traditional conflicts approach by the time the Rich-
ards plaintiffs filed suit in the late 1950s. 49 If any of the plaintiffs had in
45. Id. Until recently, the Chief Justice's supposition would not have been viable. In
1989 the Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that there was no pendent party jurisdiction over
a private codefendant of the United States in an FTCA case. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S.
545, 555-56 (1989); see also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (denying pendent party
jurisdiction in suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, how-
ever, effectively overruled Finley by establishing "supplemental jurisdiction" over parties with-
out an independent basis of federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1991); C.D.S.
Diversified v. Franchise Fin. Corp. of Am., 757 F. Supp. 202, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (construing
§ 1367); Blum v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., No. 90-2428-R, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4612, at *7 (D. Kan. Mar. 5, 1991).
46. Richards, 369 U.S. at 12 n.25.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 12 n.25 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b)); cf Berger v. Winer Sportswear, Inc., 394
F. Supp. 1110, 1113 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that because of § 1346(b) of the FTCA,
"the usual choice of law principles applicable to solely private disputes are put aside"). For
examples of where this situation would have arisen if a private defendant had been (or could
have been, see supra note 45) sued together with the United States, see Washington v. United
States, 769 F.2d 1436, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1985) (Plaintiffs sued in California, their current
residence, rather than New York, their former residence and site of medical malpractice at Air
Force hospital.); Foster v. United States, 768 F.2d 1278, 1281-84 (1lth Cir. 1985) (Plaintiff
administrator sued in Florida, both his and decedent's residence, rather than Illinois, where
Government's negligence occurred; the court applied Illinois's "most significant contacts" test,
which required application of Illinois law.).
49. See Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 559-60, 175 N.E.2d 441,443-44, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65,
69 (1961) (applying "most significant contacts" or "center of gravity" test to choose Illinois
over New York law to govern paternity contract; traditional rule would also have chosen
Illinois law); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160-61, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (1954) (applying
"center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory to select English rather than New York
law to govern enforcement of marital separation agreement); see also Richards, 369 U.S. at 12
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fact sued in New York (or some other state that had abandoned the lex
loci delicti rule), the United States would have been subject to the choice
of law rules of Oklahoma while the private defendant would have been
subject to choice of law rules that would not necessarily have referred to
the internal law of the place of injury, as Oklahoma's did. In turn, Mis-
souri's $15,000 limitation on wrongful death recoveries would have ap-
plied to the United States while the private defendant might very well
have had to pay more under the internal law of Oklahoma or New
York, 0 depending on where the district court in New York found the
center of gravity to lie.5 1 . In any event, the United States would have
been treated very differently from, and likely much better than, a private
defendant.5 2
The Court's attempt to reconcile section 1346(b) of the FTCA with
section 2674 was unnecessary. Section 1346(b), like section 2674, al-
ready provides that the United States should be treated as a private de-
fendant.5 3 Section 1346(b) makes the Government liable only "under
circumstances where the United States, ifa private person, would be lia-
ble to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place of the act or
omission."54 The juxtaposition of "private person" with "in accordance
with the law of the place of the act or omission" seems to suggest that the
FTCA's intent is to treat the United States as a private defendant under
the internal law rather than whole law of the place where the negligence
occurred. That is because a private defendant would normally be subject
to the choice of law rules of the forum state, not the state where the
negligence occurred. 5  Congress would not have gone out of its way to
specify the hypothetical private person's liability under the law of the
place of negligence if it had wanted that liability determined by the place
of injury, or some other place to which the whole law of the place of
negligence referred.
n.26 (citing cases from other jurisdictions that had abandoned or were in the process of aban-
doning lex loci delicti).
50. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 41-42, 172 N.E.2d 526, 529, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133, 137-38 (1961) (holding that New York's public policy against limitations on
recoveries in wrongful death actions justified treating Massachusetts' limitation on recovery as
procedural question controlled by New York law).
51. For a brief description of the "center of gravity" test, see supra note 49.
52. For a good juxtaposition of companion cases in which the United States was treated
differently from a private defendant under Richards, compare Halstead v. United States, 535
F. Supp. 780, 782 (D. Conn. 1981) (applying West Virginia's limitation on damages to Govern-
ment) with Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 793-94 (D. Conn. 1982) (applying
Colorado's limitation on damages to private defendant in case arising out of same plane crash).
53. See supra note 38.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
55. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
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B. The Trend Toward Modern Choice of Law Analysis
After claiming that its "whole law" interpretation of section 1346(b)
was more consistent with treating the United States as a private defend-
ant, Chief Justice Warren bolstered the Court's holding by stating that
this interpretation of the [FTCA] provides a degree of flexibility
to the law.., that would not be possible [if the internal law of
the place of negligence applied]. Recently there has been a ten-
dency on the part of some States to depart from the general
conflicts rule in order to take into account the interests of the
State having significant contact with the parties to the litiga-
tion. We can see no compelling reason to saddle the [FTCA]
with an interpretation that would prevent the federal courts
from implementing this policy in choice-of-law rules where the
State in which the negligence occurred has adopted it. Should
the States continue this rejection of the older rule in those situa-
tions where its application might appear inappropriate or ineq-
uitable, the flexibility inherent in our interpretation will also be
more in step with that judicial approach.
5 6
In the thirty years since Richards, the states have in fact continued to
reject the older rule; the majority of states currently follow one of the
more modem approaches.57 The Court's endorsement in Richards of the
more modem approaches to choice of law certainly encouraged this de-
velopment to some extent.58 In the end, however, federal law adopts
whatever is the prevailing state law, including-according to Richards-
state choice of law rules. 59 In other words, the FTCA passively "pig-
gybacks" on whatever choice of law rule happens to have been adopted
56. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12-13 1962 (footnotes omitted).
57. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 10, § 2.16, at 42 (explaining that the "rigid rules of the
First Restatement have now been abandoned in many areas of conflicts law").
58. See Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577, 583-84 (D.C. 1967) (using language from Rich-
ards, quoted in text accompanying note 56, supra, to support adoption of governmental inter-
est analysis in District of Columbia), aff'd, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Beaulieu v.
Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610, 615 (Me. 1970) (citing Richards to support Maine's adoption of Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws's appproach); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1,
20-21, 203 A.2d 796, 804-05 (1964) (citing Richards to support Pennsylvania's rejection of lex
loci delicti and adoption of governmental interest analysis); cf McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan.
625, 626-67, 400 P.2d 1018, 1019-20 (1965) (adhering to lex loci delicti rule despite parties'
arguments, based on Richards, in favor of adopting significant contacts approach); Click v.
Thuron Indus., 475 S.W.2d 715, 719-20 (Tex. 1972) (Daniel, 3., concurring) (using Richards to
support adoption of one of modern choice of law approaches for future cases, but concurring
in application of lex loci delicti in that particular case). But see Lillegraven v. Tengs, 375 P.2d
139, 140 & n.5 (Alaska 1962) (citing Richards to support application of lex loci delicti as
general choice of law rule); Wolozin v. Wolozin, 149 Conn. 739, 741, 182 A.2d 8, 9 (1962)
(citing Richards for proposition that lex loci delicti was majority rule, and following that rule).
59. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 1193, 1210-12 (E.D. Cal.
1978) (interpreting Richards to have not decided the issue of whether state law operates of its
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by the state where the negligence occurred. Development of conflicts
doctrine under state law has thus been independent of any federal man-
date, although the Supreme Court's approval of the modem learning was
persuasive authority for some state courts deciding whether to adopt one
of the modem approaches.'
Interestingly, the Court's stated policy favoring more flexible adop-
tion of new choice of law rules seems at odds with its rationale for treat-
ing the United States as a private defendant:
The general conflict-of-laws rule, followed by a vast majority of
the States [at the time of this decision], is to apply the law of
the place of injury to the substantive rights of the parties.
Therefore,... our interpretation will enable the federal courts
to treat the United States as an individual would be treated
under like circumstances.61
If the Court was so intent on encouraging new thinking in the conflicts
arena, then it should not have used the traditional rule as its basis for
trying to treat the United States like a private litigant. Ironically, the
Court's very holding in Richards-applying Oklahoma's lex loci delicti
rule-only perpetuated the viability of that rule.6" As the Court itself
acknowledged, the traditional rule had been rejected in several jurisdic-
tions by the time Richards was decided,63 and Chief Justice Warren was
rather prescient in suggesting that the rejection might continue. The
Court did not need to choose the whole law of the place where the negli-
gence occurred to further a then-embryonic modem learning, which was
already on its way to becoming the majority rule. Nor did the Court
need to regressively apply the lex loci delicti in an unsuccessful attempt
to treat the United States like a private litigant.
own force under the FTCA, and deciding instead that state law applies by adoption into fed-
eral law).
60. See supra note 58.
61. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
62. See Lillegraven, 375 P.2d at 140-41; Wolozin, 149 Conn. at 741, 182 A.2d at 9; see
also Marine Constr. & Design Co. v. Vessel Tim, 434 P.2d 683, 686, 689 (Alaska 1967) (fol-
lowing Lillegraven); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304-05, 216 A.2d 183, 184 (1966)
(following Wolozin by citing Richards to support application of lex loci delicti as majority rule
and expressly refusing to adopt one of the modem approaches despite recent advent of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws). Alaska finally seemed to abandon lex loci delicti
the year after Marine Constr. was decided, and six years after Richards. See Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699, 701-04 (Alaska 1968). Connecticut, however, did not even begin to
question its lex loci delicti rule until the 1980s. See O'Conn'or v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632,
638, 519 A.2d 13, 16 (1986) ("[W]e are not wholeheartedly committed to application of lex
loci as the sole approach to choice of laws in all torts cases.") (citing Simaitis v. Flood, 182
Conn. 24, 437 A.2d 828 (1980)); Simaitis, 182 Conn. at 29-31, 437 A.2d at 831-32 (discussing
but declining to overrule lex loci delicti, and applying workers' compensation choice of law).
63. See Richards, 369 U.S. at 12 & n.26.
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C. Congressional Intent
Not only was the Supreme Court's application of the whole law of
the place of negligence regressive insofar as it perpetuated the lex loci
delicti rule, but it also was contrary to congressional intent. Congress
expressly stated in the FTCA itself that the United States is to be liable
"in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred."" In the early 1940s, when Congress considered and passed the
FTCA, the predominant choice of law rule was lex loci delicti.6 It is
doubtful that Congress would have deliberately chosen the law of the
place of negligence only to have the law of the place of injury apply
under then prevailing choice of law rules.66 Thus, Congress enacted a
statutory choice of law rule in section 1346(b) of the FTCA; its very
choice of the place of negligence itself suggests that the internal rather
than whole law of that place be used.
The Court was heavily influenced by the fact that Congress did not
expressly consider the choice of law issue.68 Two reasons likely explain
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
65. Accord Burgio v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 865, 868 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
("Since probably all of the states in 1928," when the Federal Reservations Act (FRA) was
enacted, "applied the same choice of law rule for torts, that is, the place of the tort, it is likely
that the legislators did not consider the issue."). Commentary suggesting change in conflicts
doctrine certainly existed between 1928, when Congress passed the FRA, and 1942, when it
passed the FTCA. See, eg., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARV. L. REv. 173, 182-87 (1933) (focusing on choice of law in contracts cases); Louis B.
Sohn, New Bases for Solution of Conflict of Laws Problems, 55 HARV. L. REV. 978, 984-86
(1942) (proposing modified renvoi, among other things, to resolve conflicts issues); Comment,
Functional Application of Conflict of Laws Rules in Tort Cases, 44 YALE LJ. 1233, 1238 (1935)
(positing prototypical interest analysis whereby "forum may apply the law of the jurisdiction
which has the greatest interest in securing conformity with the particular rule in issue"). The
courts, however, were still reaffirming lex loci delicti during that period. See, e.g., Stahl v. Bell,
276 Mich. 37, 39, 267 N.W. 779, 780 (1936); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 473-74, 3 N.E.2d
597, 599-600 (1936); Kerstetter v. Elfman, 327 Pa. 17, 18, 192 A. 663, 664 (1937).
66. In deciding what the term 'law' included, the Court was not 'bound' by a direct
expression of Congress so it took notice of the prevailing state choice-of-law rule and
held that the whole law of the place of the negligence must be used so that final
reference would be to the 'place of injury' in most cases.
Recent Case, supra note 27, at 1323. Ironically, the Supreme Court itself expressly rejected an
interpretation of "the place where the act or omission occurred" to mean the place where the
negligence had its operative effect, meaning the place of injury. See supra note 5. Yet the net
effect of its whole law interpretation, at least at the time it decided Richards, when lex loci
delicti was still the majority rule, was to apply the internal law of the place of injury.
67. See Richards v. United States, 285 F.2d 521, 526 (10th Cir. 1960) (Murrah, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that when Congress did not stop at saying the United States was to be
liable as private person, but added "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred," it thereupon prescribed that the United States would become liable under
internal law), aff'd on grounds opposite to dissent, 369 U.S, 1 (1962).
68. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 8 (1962) ("It has been repeatedly observed
that Congress did not consider choice-of-law problems during the long period that the legisla-
FTCA CHOICE OF LAW
Congress' failure to address this issue explicitly. First, there simply was
no choice of law issue in the early 1940s when Congress drafted and
enacted the FTCA; as previously stated, virtually all of the states at that
time recognized lex loci delicti as the appropriate choice of law rule.6 9
Second, Congress probably assumed it had changed the presumption
favoring lex loci delicti by enacting its own statutory choice of law rule,
specifically making the United States liable in accordance with the law of
the place of negligence instead of the place of injury.70
If Congress actually had thought it neglected a choice of law issue
by failing to specify whether the internal or whole law of the place of
negligence is to be applied, if it had then specifically considered the issue,
and finally, if it expressly had directed the United States to be governed
by the choice of law rules of any place in particular, that place most
likely would have been the state where suit was filed-the forum state-
rather than the state of the negligent act or omission.71 After all, even
under traditional common-law renvoi, courts start with the choice of law
rules of the forum state and no other.72
Curiously, the Supreme Court seemed to start with the presumption
that state conflicts rules apply in the absence of congressional intent to
the contrary:73 "Certainly there is nothing in the legislative history [of
the FTCA] that even remotely supports the argument that Congress did
not intend state conflict rules to apply to multistate tort actions brought
against the Government."' 4
This analysis required the FTCA's legislative history to prove a tor-
tion was being prepared for enactment." (citing Recent Case, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1455, 1456
(1955); Note, Choice of Law Under the Federal Tort Claim Act, 45 IOWA L. Rav. 125 (1959);
Recent Case, 6 N.Y. L.F. 484, 488-490 (1960)); see also id. at 14 n.29 (quoted and discussed
infra note 82 and accompanying text).
69. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
70. See Richards, 285 F.2d at 526 (Murrah, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that FTCA "pro-
vides its own conflicts rule, that is, the law of the place of the negligent act").
71. Cf Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that
federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which they
sit); Byron Bronston, Recent Case, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 180, 183 (1962) (suggesting Congress
could solve problem of not treating United States like private individual by amending
§ 1346(b) to apply whole law of forum state). Note that Klaxon was decided only a few years
before Congress passed the FrCA, suggesting Congress knew without having to discuss the
issue that had it not specified the place of negligence as the state whose law would control, the
forum state's choice of law rules would have been applicable.
72. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 10, § 3.13, at 67 (renvoi starts with forum's choice of
law rules).
73. Accord Burgio v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 865, 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
(interpreting Richards to suggest "that when a statute incorporates state law, it presumptively
adopts that state's whole law in the absence of an indication to the contrary").
74. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 14 (1962).
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tuous negative: that state choice of law rules were not to apply when
there was no meaningful difference among them at the time Congress
passed the FTCA.75 The peculiar presumption that state conflicts rules
applied in the absence of express congressional intent to the contrary was
all the more unusual in light of the ease with which the Court dismissed
an argument by one of the litigants in Richards that the "place of the
negligent act or omission" is really the place where the negligence has its
operative effect, meaning the place of injury.76 In disposing of that argu-
ment, the Court
start[ed] with the assumption that the legislative purpose is ex-
pressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. We believe
that it would be difficult to conceive of any more precise lan-
guage Congress could have used to command application of the
law of the place where the negligence occurred than the words
it did employ in the Tort Claims Act.77
Although the "operative effect" argument is somewhat more tenuous
than the Court's "whole law" interpretation, it still would seem that the
ordinary meaning of "the law" in the context of the United States being
liable "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred" is the internal rather than whole law of that place.7 8 Unlike
the "operative effect" construction, Congress could have been more pre-
cise than simply stating "law of the place"-namely, by specifying the
"internal law of the place"; the Court, however, should not have required
that. As discussed above,7 9 almost all the states would have chosen the
law of the place of injury at the time Congress passed the FTCA and
Congress probably thought it had specifically rejected that choice by se-
lecting the law of the place of negligence.
Moreover, Congress may have had good reason to specifically select
the law of the place of negligence to govern the liability of the United
States. One commentator has observed that "government employees are
normally subjected to numerous regulations, some of which are based
upon the local law of the employment area. By applying the internal law
of the place of negligence, the Government's liability would be deter-
mined by the law to which its employees had adapted their conduct." 80
75. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
76. Richards, 369 U.S. at 9-10; see supra notes 4-5.
77. Richards, 369 U.S. at 9.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988); see pre-Richards cases cited supra note 3. But see Hess v.
United States, 259 F.2d 285, 291 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding that "statutory words, 'law of the
place,' are broad enough to include [conflicts rules] and those areas are not excepted in the
statute"), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
80. Bronston, supra note 71, at 183; see, eg., 41 C.F.R. § 101-38.301-3 (1990) (requiring
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Even if the particular conduct in question were not based on federal reg-
ulation piggybacking on local law, the internal law of the place of negli-
gence would still be the most logical choice for determining the United
States' liability.
Not only is the Court's presumption in favor of applying whole law
unusual, but the legislative history of the FTCA more than "remotely"
8'
supports the proposition that Congress did not intend whole law to ap-
ply. In fact, it seems to expressly do so. In the footnote immediately
following its statement that the legislative history fails to show that
whole law was not to apply, the Court itself acknowledges that Congress
defined the phrase "law of the place where the act or omission occurred"
as "local tort law,"82 among other things."3 "Local tort law" would seem
federal employees using government owned or leased vehicles to obey state and local traffic
laws); 41 C.F.R. § 101-47.307-1 (1990) (requiring real property to be disposed of by quitclaim
deed or deed without warranty "in conformity with local law and practice").
81. Richards, 369 U.S. at 14.
82. Id. at 14 n.29 (emphasis added) (citing in part Tort Claims: Hearings on HR. 5373
and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1942)
[hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Attorney General,
United States Department of Justice)). The context of Assistant Attorney General Shea's ref-
erence to "local tort law" was as follows:
Mr. Shea: Under the other bill [H.R. 5373] it was not specifically provided that local
law should govern ....
Mr. [Emanuel] Celler [Representative from New York]: Do you need that? Is that
necessary to express it?
Mr. Shea: I should think the earlier bill [H.R. 5373] would probably be construed as
applying local tort law, but this bill [H.R. 6364] specifically covers it ....
Mr. Celler: The only trouble is in future bills you may have to put that precedent in.
If you leave it out the courts may not construe it should apply. I am only thinking
out loud to get your reaction.
Mr. Shea: This bill provides explicitly for the application of local law.
House Hearings, supra, at 30 (emphasis added). Apparently, Congressman Celler was wrong
in suggesting future bills might require specification that local tort law apply, because the
Supreme Court did not even construe it to apply in Richards despite such specification. But cf
Bronston, supra note 71, at 182 & n.13 (construing Assistant Attorney General Shea's com-
ments to insure only that the Government's liability would be determined by state law in
general, as opposed to federal law or the internal law of the place where the act or omission
occurred).
83. Richards, 369 U.S. at 14 n.29. In that footnote, the Court identified five different
phrases in the legislative history of the FTCA that make apparent reference to "the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred": (1) "the law of the situs of the wrongful act or
omission," House Hearings, supra note 82, at 35; (2) "local law," id at 30 & passim (the
Richards Court also cited several other legislative reports containing references to "local law"
that are not particularly helpful and therefore are not cited here); (3) "local tort law," id. at
30; (4) "the law of the situs of the alleged tort," Tort Claims Against the United States: Hear-
ings on S. 2690 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
44 (1940) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Connecticut Senator John A. Danaher);
(5) "the locale of the injury or damage." House Hearings, supra note 82, at 9.
The first reference, "the law of the situs of the act or omission," simply restates the statu-
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to suggest congressional contemplation of the internal law rather than
whole law of the state where the negligent act or omission occurred.
tory language with the word "situs" substituted for its synonym "place." Although that lan-
guage itself provides no clues to congressional intent, its context-the "foreign country
exclusion"--certainly does. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
The second reference, "local law," similarly adds little toward revealing congressional
intent except for the numerous contexts in which it is used. One of those contexts is the
decision to vest exclusive rather than concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts. House
Hearings, supra note 82, at 61, (i). One of the reasons given for exclusive district court
jurisdiction was that "the district court sits in only one State and is familiar with the local laws
and decisions which are to govern the determination of tort claims against the United States."
Id
The implication in the above passage is that Congress expected the district courts to apply
the internal tort law of the state in which they sit, rather than the tort law of some other state
chosen by the conflicts rules of the state in which they sit, with which the courts would not be
as familiar. Of course, this assumes, as Chief Justice Warren did, that the plaintiff sues in a
federal district of the state where the negligence occurred, instead of where he resides. See
Richards, 369 U.S. at 12 & n.25; supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text. Yet the language
quoted above certainly seems to evince Congress's intent to have the district courts apply the
internal law rather than whole law of the state where the negligence occurs.
Another context of "local law" in the legislative history of the FTCA is the administrative
adjustment of tort claims. House Hearings, supra note 82, at 26 (2), 59 (ii). House Bill
6463 provided that "local law" would apply to administrative as well as judicial claims. Id
Assuming the same local law applied to administrative claims as to judicial ones, it is doubtful
that Congress would expect administrative agencies to apply choice of law rules, as it would
federal courts.
In addition, many courts use "local law" synonymously with internal law. See, e.g.,
Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 1973) (considering whether to "apply
the choice of law rules of New Jersey or simply New Jersey's local law" and "applying New
Jersey's local law in order to remain faithful to the governmental interests").
The third reference in the legislative history, "local tort law," appears to evince clear
congressional intent to apply the internal "tort" law of the place of the act or omission rather
than the choice of law rules of that place. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
The fourth reference, "the law of the situs of the alleged tort," does not itself specify
whether the "situs" is the place where the negligent act or omission occurs-giving rise to duty
and breach of duty--or the place where the injury occurs that ripens the tort into a cause of
action. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLicT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). The context of the refer-
ence, however, suggests it is the place of negligence:
Senator [John] Danaher [of Connecticut]: If we apply the rule of respondeat superior
we should do it, should we not, on the basis of the law of the situs of the alleged tort?
Mr. [Alexander] Holtzoff [Special Assistant to the Attorney General]: I agree with
that. My thought was that provision [presumably "the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred"] would accomplish that very result.
Senate Hearings, supra, at 44. If Senator Danaher was concerned that the United States' vica-
rious liability for its employees' torts was to be governed by "the law of the situs of the alleged
tort," he could only have meant the situs of the employees' negligence, not the situs of the
plaintiff's injury. See Morici Corp. v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 714, 717 (E.D. Cal. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982). The location of the plaintiff's injury is
irrelevant in determining whether the government employee was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time he committed the negligent act or omission. Mr. Holtzoff's rejoinder
seems to confirm that interpretation.
Finally, "the locale of the injury or damage" is simply a misstatement by Assistant Attor-
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If "local tort law" did not intimate that internal law should apply,
then almost certainly the "foreign country exclusion" and some of its
history did. 4 The FTCA exempts from coverage claims arising in a for-
eign country.15 A claim arises in a foreign country when the act or omis-
sion occurs there.86 The following syllogism was one of the stated
reasons for the foreign country exemption: "Since liability is to be deter-
mined by the law of the situs of the wrongful act or omission, it is wise to
restrict the bill to claims arising in this country."87 That history clearly
contemplates the possibility that, without the foreign country exclusion,
the United States would be governed by the law of a foreign country if its
employees' negligence occurred there.8 Congress definitely did not want
the United States governed by the unfamiliar law of a foreign sovereign.89
Yet that is precisely what could happen under Chief Justice Warren's
ney General Shea in discussing the venue, rather than choice of law, provision of the FTCA.
House Hearings, supra note 82, at 9. The venue provision gives the FTCA plaintiff the option
of suing where he resides "or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred," not "the
locale of the injury or damage." 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1988). Assistant Attorney General
Shea's misstatement thus fails to elucidate the meaning of the phrase "law of the place where
the act or omission occurred."
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988) (excluding from the FTCA claims arising in a foreign
country); House Hearings, supra note 82, at 29 (l)(ii).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
86. See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 737 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(citing Richards, 369 U.S. at 9-10, for proposition that FTCA claim arises for purpose of
determining place of negligence under § 1346(b)-as opposed to foreign country exclusion
under § 2680(k)-where negligence occurred, not where it had its operative effect); Aanestad
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 521 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974);
Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 522 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974);
L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., 265 F.2d 768, 773-74 n.12 (9th Cir. 1959). But cf.
Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that
"'a tort is deemed to occur at the place where injury is sustained regardless of the place of
origin of the negligent act'" for purposes of Death on High Seas Act, although the plaintiff
attempted to bring claim under FTCA, which excludes claims in admiralty (quoting Chapman
v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1967))).
87. House Hearings, supra note 82, at 29, % (1)(ii) (comparing H.R. 5373 to H.R. 6463,
which added foreign country exclusion); id. at 35 (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant
Attorney General, United States Department of Justice).
88. An example given in the context of the previously quoted syllogism confirms this:
Mr. Shea: Claims arising in a foreign country have been exempted from this bill ....
Since liability is to be determined by the law of the situs of the wrongful, act or
omission it is wise to restrict the bill to claims arising in this country. This seems
desirable because the law of the particular State is being applied. Otherwise, it will
lead, I think, to a great deal of difficulty.
Mr. [John M.] Robsion [Representative of Kentucky]: You mean by that any repre-
sentative of the United States who committed a tort in England or some other coun-
try could not be reached under this?
Mr. Shea: That is right.
House Hearings, supra note 82, at 35.
89. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949).
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authorization of renvoi in Richards. Assuming the negligence occurs in
the United States so that the claim arises there, but the injury from that
negligence occurs in a foreign country or the foreign country otherwise
has the most significant relationship to or interest in the tort, then the
choice of law rules of the state of negligence might very well refer the
forum court to foreign law.9 0 That would certainly be a result Congress
did not intend-indeed, that it specifically precluded, according to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the foreign country exclusion. 91 The
FTCA's legislative history, together with the plain meaning of its lan-
guage, suggests that Congress intended the United States to be governed
by the internal rather than whole law of the place of negligence.
90. See Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 741-45. In that case, the court held the foreign
country exclusion inapplicable because the case "arose" in California, where the negligent acts
and omissions occurred. In applying California's "government interest" choice of law analy-
sis, the court seemed to seriously consider applying the law of damages from any of 24 foreign
countries, especially France, the situs of the crash, and Japan, the domicile of several of its
victims. Id
The court ultimately did select California law to apply to the damage issues, but its analy-
sis reeked of forum bias. See id. at 744-45 ("Generally a forum applies its own law, and it is
incumbent on a litigant who wishes to apply the law of a foreign state to demonstrate that the
latter rule of decision 'will further the interest of the foreign state' "). Moreover, the court
never considered whether the foreign country exemption would have precluded application of
foreign internal law had California's interest analysis warranted it. It could well have been
compelled to apply the law of France had California followed lex loci delicti or had the negli-
gence occurred in a state that did. See also O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 850-
51 (2d Cir. 1984) (considering application of Greek law, but ultimately choosing New York
law to apply under New York's choice of law rules and not reaching Government's alternative
argument that Greek law could not apply because of foreign country exclusion); Leaf v. United
States, 588 F.2d 733, 736 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) (presuming California, situs of at least some
negligence, together with Arizona and Mexico, would apply its own law under California
choice of law rules, thereby obviating need to decide whether application of Mexican law
would contravene legislative intent of foreign country exclusion). But see Sami v. United
States, 617 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[P]revailing conflicts principles in the District of
Columbia and elsewhere... permit application of an alternate substantive law[] when foreign
law conflicts with a strong public policy of the forum."). The court's conclusion in Sami is
somewhat doubtful for several reasons. First, the court relied exclusively on the public policy
exception to invalidate foreign law. The court itself acknowledged the narrowness of that
exception. Id at 763 n. 10. Second, the public policy exception could just as easily invalidate
the law of another state as it could the law of a foreign country (assuming the laws of foreign
countries are no more obnoxious to the forum than those of other states). Third, the public
policy exception certainly takes care of foreign law that is antithetical to American jurispru-
dence. It does not speak, however, to the situation in which the foreign law does not offend the
public policy of the forum, yet is nevertheless unfamiliar to it. In that case, the forum court
would still be in the position of applying foreign law contrary to the express wishes of Con-
gress. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221. Finally, Sami does not suggest which "alternate substan-
tive law" the forum would choose if the choice of law rules of the place of negligence clearly
point to foreign law. Most states' choice of law rules do not provide for a "second best"
choice.
91. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221.
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II. LOWER FEDERAL COURTS' APPLICATION OF RICHARDS
Generally, the lower federal courts have used the flexibility the
Supreme Court gave them in Richards to award plaintiffs the largest pos-
sible recovery if the applicable choice of law rule gives them the discre-
tion to do so. 92 Courts usually have this flexibility when lex loci delicti is
92. See, ag., Foster v. United States, 768 F.2d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1985) (using Illinois's
"most significant relationship" test to reverse district court's choice of Florida law, which
barred surviving daughter's recovery due to her financial independence from parents just
before their death, in favor of Illinois law, which permitted her to recover pecuniary damages
despite financial independence); Butler v. United States, 726 F.2d 1057, 1066 (5th Cir. 1984)
(using Mississippi's "most significant relationship" test to affirm district court's choice of Mis-
sissippi law of damages over Government's argument for application of Louisiana law, which
presumably afforded plaintiffs less of a recovery); Guillory v. United States, 699 F.2d 781, 784-
87 (5th Cir. 1983) (using Texas's "most significant relationship" test to reverse district court's
choice of Texas law, which limited plaintiff's award to only $1200 in funeral expenses, in favor
of Louisiana law, which permitted recovery for love and affection in addition to pecuniary
loss); Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (using District of
Columbia's interest analysis to choose District's law over Virginia's, which apparently would
have foreclosed plaintiff's recovery); Loge v. United States, 662 F.2d 1268, 1273-74 (8th Cir.
1981) (applying District of Columbia's governmental interest analysis to reverse district
court's dismissal of polio victim's complaint by choosing law of Arkansas, whose policy would
be to compensate its domiciliaries), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982); Tyminski v. United
States, 481 F.2d 257, 265-68 (3d Cir. 1973) (employing New York's interest analysis to reverse
district court's choice of New York law in favor of New Jersey law, which permitted plaintiff's
recovery for gratuitous nursing services); Reminga v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 445, 457-59
(W.D. Mich. 1978) (using Wisconsin's "choice influencing factors" to choose Michigan law
over Wisconsin law, which would have "substantially limited" plaintiffs' recovery), aff'd on
other grounds, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980); Merchants Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 272 F. Supp. 409, 419 (D.N.D. 1967) (imputing "most significant relationship" choice
of law rules to South Dakota, and using those rules to select North Dakota law, which did not
limit plaintiffs' recovery as other states with contacts to case did); cf Washington v. United
States, 769 F.2d 1436, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985) (using New York's "center of gravity" test to
affirm district court's choice of New York law in case of medical malpractice at Air Force
hospital, but reversing its dismissal on statute of limitations grounds because the cause of
action accrued when patient died rather than when she went into coma); Poindexter v. United
States, 752 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying Nevada's whole law to reverse district
court's choice of Arizona law, under which plaintiff's claim was barred based on her receipt of
workers' compensation death benefits, and remanding for determination of "what substantive
law Nevada would apply," although ambiguity remained as to whether "substantive law"
meant internal law of Nevada or of some other state chosen by Nevada's whole law); Ducey v.
United States, 713 F.2d 504, 508-09 nn.2, 4 (9th Cir. 1983) (employing what court interpreted
to be Nevada's "most significant relationship" test to affirm district court's choice of Nevada
law to govern recreational accident, but reversing on grounds that Nevada's recreational use
statute permitted plaintiffs to recover); Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, 639 F. Supp.
385, 390-91 & n.2 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (using Texas's "most significant relationship" test to
choose Texas law after acknowledging important differences between Texas and Georgia law
on issue of damages, but leaving unclear which parties those differences favored). But see
Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435, 1445, 1450-51 (5th Cir. 1990) (af-
firming district court's application of Louisiana law to damage issue and thus permitting lower
recovery than Texas, although court in effect used dipegage to apply Texas law to liability
issue); O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 846-51 (2d Cir. 1984) (selecting New
York law, which limited plaintiff's recovery to pecuniary damages, over Greek law, which had
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not clearly the law of the place of negligence.93 In some of these cases,
concededly, the result would have been the same under the internal law
construction of section 1346(b), even if the court had not manipulated
the whole law of the place of negligence to help the plaintiff.94 In many
cases, however, the court helped the plaintiff by choosing the internal law
of a place other than that of the negligence, contrary to legislative intent
but with the Supreme Court's blessing.9"
A notable example of this tendency is Guillory v. United States,9 6 a
Veterans Administration (VA) medical malpractice/wrongful death case.
In Guillory, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
chose to apply Louisiana law and therefore reversed the district court's
choice of Texas law and its consequent award of only $1200 for funeral
expenses.97 In contrast to Texas, Louisiana allowed recovery for loss of
love and affection, 98 which presumably would have produced an award
much higher than $1200. The Fifth Circuit held that because Louisiana
and Texas law were substantially identical on the issue of liability, Loui-
siana law better furthered the policies of both states by (1) protecting
Texas' interest in policing the conduct of doctors within its boundaries,
no such limitation); Doyle v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 1278, 1285 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (choos-
ing Louisiana law, as Government urged, over California law, which favored plaintiffs); cf
Hensley v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 716, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (finding against plaintiff after
somewhat summarily choosing Florida law under New York's interest analysis, but leaving it
unclear whether result would have been any different under New York negligence law); Don-
aldson v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 735, 739-40 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (selecting Arizona over
Florida law under Arizona's "most significant relationship" test, although Arizona's recent
enactment of comparative negligence statute would have permitted plaintiff's recovery and
adequately compensated Florida domiciliaries).
93. See Springer v. United States, 641 F. Supp. 913, 934 (D.S.C. 1986), aff'd, 819 F.2d
1139 (4th Cir. 1987); Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 780, 782 (D. Conn. 1981); Griffin
v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10, 33-37 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
94. See, e.g., Foster, 768 F.2d at 1284 (affording plaintiffs greater recovery by choosing
internal law of place of negligence under whole law of that place); Butler, 726 F.2d at 1066
(same); Hitchcock, 665 F.2d at 359-61 (same); cf Washington, 769 F.2d at 1438 (affording
plaintiffs greater recoveries by construing internal law of place of negligence favorably to them,
rather than by simply choosing that law); Ducey, 713 F.2d at 508-09 nn.2, 4 (same).
95. See, eg., Guillory, 699 F.2d at 784-87 (affording plaintiffs greater recovery by choos-
ing internal law of place other than that of negligence); Loge, 662 F.2d at 1273 (same); Tymin-
ski, 481 F.2d at 265-68 (same); Reminga, 448 F. Supp. at 457-59 (same); Merchants Nat'l
Bank, 272,F. Supp. at 419 (same).
96. 699 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1983).
97. Id. at 784-87. In choosing Louisiana law, the court used Texas's "most significant
relationship test," which looks to the qualitative nature of the contacts an event has had with a
jurisdiction. Id. at 784. After weighing each jurisdiction's policy interests, the court con-
cluded that Louisiana bore "the most significant relationship to the occurrence in question."
Id at 786.
98. Id. at 784 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1982), current version at art.
2315 (West 1991)).
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and (2) compensating Louisiana domiciliaries adequately enough to pre-
vent them from becoming burdens on the state.99
What the Guillory court apparently failed to consider was how the
issue of damages interacted with the issue of liability under Texas tort
law. The Texas damage limitation quite obviously reflected a policy
against punishing negligent doctors (or other tortfeasors) too severely,
perhaps to keep insurance premiums under control."° Louisiana law,
although consistent with Texas law on the isolated issue of liability,
tended to undermine Texas' policy against large wrongful death verdicts.
At the same time Louisiana was fulfilling its policy of adequately com-
pensating its domiciliaries, it was denigrating Texas' interest in protect-
ing doctors against large damage awards.
The result in Guillory was certainly an equitable one; yet it was not
one contemplated by a Congress that only partially waived sovereign im-
munity in the FTCA. The VA's doctors treated the plaintiff's decedent
in Texas.' 0 1 That was surely the place whose law Congress would have
expected to govern, whether it had the most significant relationship to
the tort or not. 102 Congress would have expected VA doctors not only to
conform their standard of care to Texas law, but also to be punished for
breaches of that standard in accordance with Texas's law of damages,
whether it allowed recovery for funeral expenses, love and affection, or
nothing at all.103 As policy matters, the issues of liability and damages
are inextricably bound. Despite an indisputably fair conclusion and a
99. Id. at 785-86; accord Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, 639 F. Supp. 385, 390-91
(E.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that Georgia's interest in compensating its citizens "is important.
only when Georgia will be forced to bear the burden of providing for injured citizens who are
inadequately compensated").
100. Cf O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1984) ("New York, in
order to discourage forum shopping and encourage business within the state, has a governmen-
tal interest in assuring that defendants will not be subject to damage awards larger than [pecu-
niary damages resulting from decedent's death].").
101. After negligently treating their patient, the Veterans Administration doctors released
him for the weekend. The patient returned home to Louisiana and died the next day. Guil-
lory, 699 F.2d at 783.
102. Cf Doyle v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 1278, 1285 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("[T]o deter-
mine [a psychiatrist's] duties, not in accordance with the law of the state in which the psychia-
trist practices, but rather in accordance with the law of the state the patient may return to,
would render psychiatrists subject to varying and uncertain standards.").
103. Plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers might cry foul at the suggestion of abandoning the
Richards rule and limiting a widow's award to $1200 for funeral expenses in a future case
similar to Guillory. But it must be noted that abandoning the Richards rule does not require
limiting a plaintiff's damages in every case. In Guillory, for example, had it been Louisiana
that limited damages to funeral expenses and Texas that allowed recovery for love and affec-
tion, application of the internal rather than whole law of the state where the negligence oc-
curred, as suggested here, would mandate selection of Texas's hypothetically more generous
measure of damages. Had Texas actually permitted a higher award than Louisiana, the Fifth
1992]
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well-reasoned analysis, Guillory makes one of the best cases for rethink-
ing Richards.
In a more overt manipulation of state law and state choice of law
rules, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Loge
v. United States,104 imputed to Arkansas a plaintiff-oriented tort rule that
conflicted with District of Columbia law.105 It then chose the imputed
Arkansas tort rule under the District's governmental interest analysis."16
The plaintiff in Loge contracted polio in Arkansas after coming into con-
tact with a live polio vaccine which the Government failed to test prop-
erly in the District of Columbia.10 7 The district court found that the
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under either District of Columbia.
or Arkansas law, and therefore engaged in no choice of law analysis be-
cause the laws of the two jurisdictions did not conflict.1 o0
The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding a conflict between Arkansas
and District of Columbia law." 9 According to the court, the District
Circuit's thorough yet result-oriented choice of law analysis in Guillory might very well have
come out the other way.
104. 662 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
105. Id at 1273-74.
106. Id at 1274; see infra note 114. Although the Loge court purported to apply the Dis-
trict's governmental interest analysis, it stated that "[k]ey factors in making this determination
include the place where the injury occurred, the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred, and the residence of the parties." Loge, 662 F.2d at 1274 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF; LAWS § 145 (1971)). These "key factors" are actually three of the
four contacts listed in the Restatement's "most significant relationship" test for torts, rather
than elements of interest analysis. Such contacts may indeed have some bearing on which
state's policy would be advanced by having its law applied to the facts, but they are not neces-
sarily considered in interest analysis jurisdictions. See generally Gary L. Milhollin, The New
Law of Choice of Law in the District of Columbia, 24 CATH. U. L. REV. 448, 452-78 (1975)
(discussing the application of the interest analysis to torts in the District of Columbia).
Conversely, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, like interest analysis, considers
the policies of interested states, but does so only in the context of specific contacts it enumer-
ates for different kinds of cases. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 6 (1971) (listing general principles to be used in determining which state has most significant
relationship to any kind of case) with id § 145 (mandating application of general principles
from § 6 to tort cases but enumerating specific contacts to which those principles should be
applied). The net effect of this seems to be that there is certainly an overlap between interest
analysis and the Restatement insofar as they are both modern choice of law approaches consid-
ering policies behind conflicting laws, but their methodology differs significantly, and often in
outcome-determinative ways. One commentator has suggested that the drafters of the second
Restatement were advocates of governmental interest analysis. Smith, supra note 34, at 1046.
Unfortunately, the courts have applied the factors provided in the Restatement mechanically,
"undercutting the vitality of the true interest analysis." Id.
107. Loge, 662 F.2d at 1273.
108. Id
109. Id. at 1274.
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clearly would have barred the plaintiff's cause of action.1 10 Although the
Arkansas courts had never addressed the issue, the district court pre-
dicted they would adopt section 324A of the Second Restatement of
Torts, which imposes liability for the negligent performance of an under-
taking. '11 The Eighth Circuit found that under section 324A of the Re-
statement, "presumably the government could be found liable under the
theory that it failed to exercise reasonable care in undertaking to ensure
the safety of live, oral poliovirus vaccine. The underlying policy goal of
this tort rule would appear to be to compensate the injured."1 1 2 Evi-
dently, the Eighth Circuit's underlying policy goal, like that of Arkansas,
was to compensate the injured, for it found "applicable the Arkansas rule
in favor of protecting its citizens from injuries" because the plaintiffs
were residents of Arkansas and the injury occurred there.'
1 3
Although the court of appeals stated that the place of the negligence
was a "key factor" in the District's interest analysis,1 1 4 it gave that factor
little weight, for in its choice of law analysis it made no mention of the
fact that the United States' negligence could only have occurred in the
District, where it failed to ensure the vaccine's safety. Nor did the court
mention the apparent policy behind the District's law, which was to pro-
tect one of its larger employers, the United States Government, from lia-
bility based on a negligent undertaking.1 Because Arkansas courts had
110. Id. at 1273 (citing Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., 610 F.2d 558, 561 (8th Cir.
1979)).
111. Id. at 1273-74 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965)); cf.
Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409, 419 (D.N.D. 1967)
(imputing modem choice of law rule to South Dakota to permit selection of North Dakota
law, thereby affording plaintiff greater recovery). The Arkansas courts still have not ad-
dressed the issue of liability for a negligent undertaking. Five years after Merchants National
Bank, the South Dakota Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the modem approaches and
adopted lex loci delicti. Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 259, 194 N.W.2d 164, 169 (1972).
112. Loge, 662 F.2d at 1274.
113. Id
114. The three "key factors" used by the court in Loge were actually from the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Law's "most significant relationship" test, not the District of Colum-
bia's interest analysis. See id at 1274 (citing REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF
LAWS § 145 (1971)); supra note 106. The Eighth Circuit also cited one of its own precedents,
Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., 610 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1979), for the proposition that
the three factors were part of the District's interest analysis. Loge, 662 F.2d at 1274. Gelley,
however, erroneously relied on a Distridt of Columbia Circuit opinion for that proposition.
Gelley, 610 F.2d at 561 n.4 (citing Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 575 F.2d 922, 924 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (stating that "the method of governmental interest analysis is (1) to identify the state
policies underlying each law in conflict, and (2) to decide which state's policy would be ad-
vanced by having its law applied to the facts")). Moreover, the Loge court omitted mention of
the center of the parties' relationship, the fourth "key factor" in the Restatement's analysis.
115. See Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (analogizing Gov-
ernment to national corporation headquartered in District of Columbia, which "would have
some interest in having its law applied to decide the liability of a business headquartered
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
taken no affirmative steps to compensate Arkansas domiciliaries in a neg-
ligent undertaking situation, and because the Eighth Circuit had to im-
pute such steps, it would appear that the District's interest in protecting
the Government with its own clearly articulated law of nonliability for
negligent undertakings outweighed Arkansas's unarticulated law. Yet
the court of appeals seemed more intent on compensating the plaintiff in
Loge than on applying Richards fairly.
In Tyminski v. United States, I6 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit devised yet another way to manipulate Richards to
provide the plaintiff with a larger recovery than she would have received
had the internal law of the place of negligence applied. In Tyminski, the
plaintiff's husband suffered from paraplegia caused by medical malprac-
tice at a Veterans Administration hospital in New York.' 1 7 After he
died, the plaintiff sued to recover the value of gratuitous nursing services
she rendered in caring for his condition at home in New Jersey. 18 New
York law barred recovery for gratuitous nursing services and the district
court applied New York law to deny the plaintiff recovery for their
value. 119
The Third Circuit reversed the district court by choosing New
Jersey substantive law under New York's governmental interest analysis.
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court had not then faced the issue,
120
the Third Circuit predicted that it would have permitted recovery of gra-
tuitous nursing services.' 2' The court of appeals followed a New York
case that refused to apply an Illinois limitation on wrongful death recov-
ery; the New York case, in turn, followed reasoning espoused in a federal
case that "[t]he predominant interests to be served on the issue of dam-
ages are those of the states containing the people or estates which will
receive the recoverable damages."' 22 Because the plaintiff in Tyminski
was a New Jersey resident while she was rendering gratuitous nursing
services to her husband, "New Jersey law would determine the measure
there"). But see supra note 11 (discussing United States' lack of domicile for choice of law
purposes).
116. 481 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1973).
117. Id at 260.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 266 (citing Coyne v. Campbell, ll N.Y.2d 372, 376, 183 N.E.2d 891, 893, 230
N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1962)).
120. Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court faced the issue and vindicated the Third
Circuit's prediction by upholding recovery for gratuitous nursing services. Bandel v. Fried-
rich, 122 N.J. 235, 239, 584 A.2d 800, 802 (1991).
121. Tyminski, 481 F.2d at 268-70.
122. Id. at 267 (discussing Thomas v. United Air Lines, 24 N.Y.2d 714, 724, 249 N.E,2d
755, 759-60, 301 N.Y.S.2d 973, 979 (quoting Manos v. Trans World Airlines, 295 F. Supp.
1170, 1173 (N.D. I1. 1969)), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 991 (1969)).
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of damages... when there exists no object of wrongdoing New York
would have a particular interest in preventing."' 2 3 Apparently, the court
assumed New York had no interest in preventing the VA's wrongdoing
even though its medical malpractice occurred there. Although New
York's prohibition of recovery for gratuitous nursing services would not
help deter medical malpractice, it might signal a valid policy not to un-
justly enrich its victims or overpenalize its perpetrators. 24
After using the renvoi authorized in Richards to choose New Jersey
over New York law, the Third Circuit applied traditional common-law
renvoi to justify its choice of law. 2' The United States alternatively ar-
gued in Tyminski that New York's choice of law rules would look to
New Jersey's whole law rather than internal law, which in turn would
refer back to New York's internal law.'26 The Third Circuit disposed of
this argument by noting that New Jersey also employed governmental
interest analysis and would, like New York, choose New Jersey law.
127
The court thereby used an apparent "false conflict' 2 between New
York's and New Jersey's choice of law rules to avoid common-law renvoi
creating a result inconsistent with Richards's statutory renvoi. More-
over, the court hypothesized, even if New Jersey applied New York law,
it would also use renvoi and look to New York's whole law. 129 That
would once again result in the selection of New Jersey internal law under
123. Id.
124. Cf supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that New York and other states
have legitimate interest in creating a favorable business climate by limiting damage awards).
Although the VA was owned and operated by the United States, that is not a reason to assume
New York had no interest in limiting the VA's exposure to damages for medical malpractice.
Presumably, the VA provided jobs to New Yorkers, medical care for New York veterans, and a
clientele for the New York businesses in its environs. Although the United States would pay
for gratuitous nursing services in Tyminski, New York would ultimately foot the bill if its VA
hospital became such a drain on federal resources that it had to be shut down.
125. See Tyminski, 481 F.2d at 267-68.
126. Id. at 267.
127. Id at 268.
128. "A false conflict exists when the potentially applicable laws do not differ,... or when
one law ... is not intended to apply" to a given situation. ScOLas & HAY, supra note 10,
§ 2.6, at 17. The kind of false conflict that exists when the potentially applicable laws simply
do not differ, as in Tyminski, is not terribly meaningful because the parties will have no incen-
tive to argue for the application of one law over another. Id at n.8. The more significant kind
of false conflict usually arises in the context of governmental interest analysis when the laws of
two or more states differ, but the application of one does not impair the policy behind the law
of the other. See id. at n.9; see also Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 187 (3d Cir.
1991) ("A false conflict exists if only one jurisdiction's governmental interests would be im-
paired by the application of the other jurisdiction's law.").
129. Tyminski, 481 F.2d at 268 (citing Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 525-26,
263 A.2d 129, 136-37 (1970)).
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New York's governmental interest analysis. 130
Tyminski's "double renvoi" was only one in a series of progressively
calculated analyses designed to assure plaintiffs more money. In Guil-
lory, the Fifth Circuit ignored Texas's interest in limiting the liability of
doctors in order to permit the plaintiff's recovery for love and affection
under Louisiana law. 3' In Loge, the Eighth Circuit ignored the District
of Columbia's interest in protecting the Government from liability for its
negligent undertakings, and instead allowed the plaintiffs to recover
under a rule that Arkansas courts had not adopted, but that the Eighth
Circuit predicted they would adopt.'32 Finally, in Tyminski, the Third
Circuit ignored New York's interest in limiting the liability of a VA hos-
pital operating within its borders to award a New Jersey plaintiff the
value of gratuitous nursing services that she rendered to her husband.' 33
Several other circuits have also used Richards to afford the plaintiffs
a higher recovery, even though the result would have been the same
under the internal law construction of section 1346(b).134 At least two
district courts have rather openly manipulated the Richards analysis to
do the same, when the result would have been quite different under the
internal law construction.1 35 But as another district court stated, "[ilt
would be as improper to apply forum law merely because it allows a
higher return as it would be improper to apply foreign law merely be-
cause it allows a lower return; and the converse is true."'136 The only
consistency among most of the cases applying Richards is that plaintiffs
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
134. See Foster v. United States, 768 F.2d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1985) (choosing Illinois
law under Illinois's "most significant relationship" test to permit surviving daughter to recover
pecuniary damages despite her financial independence from parents prior to their death); But-
ler v. United States, 726 F.2d 1057, 1066 (5th Cir. 1984) (choosing Mississippi law under
Mississippi's "most significant relationship" test to award plaintiff greater recovery); Hitch-
cock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 359-60 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (choosing District of Columbia
law under District's interest analysis to allow plaintiff recovery that Virginia law would have
completely foreclosed).
135. Reminga v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 445, 457-59 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (choosing
Michigan law over Wisconsin law, which would have "substantially limited" plaintiffs' recov-
ery), aff'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980); Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409,419 (D.N.D. 1967) (selecting North Dakota law, which did
not limit plaintiffs' recovery as did other states with contacts to case); ef Hensley v. United
States, 728 F. Supp. 716, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (unclear from opinon whether ultimate choice of
law helped or hurt plaintiff); Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 385,
390-91 & n.2 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (same), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 828
F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1987); Donaldson v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(same).
136. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 745 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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always receive a higher return than they would had the court used its
discretion to choose another state's law under the whole law of the place
of negligence.
III. THE MULTIPLE PLACE OF NEGLIGENCE DILEMMA
Just as Richards led to a "double renvoi" in Tyminski, it has created
a "double choice of law"-a choice of whole law in addition to choice of
internal law-in cases in which the Government's negligence occurs in
more than one place. 137 "Richards sheds no light on the question of
which state's law applies"'138 in that situation. Unlike non-FTCA cases,
in which the court always starts with the forum's choice of law rules, the
137. Recent Case, supra note 27, at 1324; see also Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d
354, 359-60 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying District of Columbia choice of law rules because rele-
vant "act or omission" in case of negligent administration of rabies vaccine occurred in Dis-
trict of Columbia, where Government formulated procedures for vaccine, rather than in
Virginia, where nurse merely administered vaccine) (see infra text accompanying notes 156-
57); Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Indiana whole and
internal law, even though negligence spread among Indiana, Illinois, and Arkansas, because
both last and most significant negligent act having causal effect occurred there and Indiana
would have chosen its own internal law under either lex loci delicti or most significant contacts
rule) (see infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United
States, 527 F. Supp. 962, 966 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (applying Tennessee law under Tennessee's and
arguably Arkansas's lex loci delicti rule, although allegedly negligent air traffic controllers
located in Missouri, Tennessee, and Arkansas); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States,
462 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that Nevada's lex loci delicti rule would
apply to case where alleged negligent acts or omissions occurred in Nevada and California); In
re Silver Bridge Disaster Litig., 381 F. Supp. 931, 941-42, 944-47 & n.18 (S.D. W. Va. 1974)
(applying District of Columbia, West Virginia, and Ohio choice of law rules to select law of
West Virginia and Ohio, between which there was no conflict on issue of Government's liabil-
ity for collapse of bridge connecting West Virginia and Ohio, but reserving ruling on which
state's law applied to issue of damages, on which there was a difference); Kantlehner v. United
States, 279 F. Supp. 122, 125-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (applying internal law of either New York or
Maryland, between which there was no conflict, when negligent acts and omissions occurred in
any combination of nine jurisdictions, whose respective choice of law rules would select the
law of those two states); cf Emelwon, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.2d 9, 13 (5th Cir.) (applying
Florida law in remanding case to district court, but suggesting that parties could show on
retrial that negligence occurred elsewhere, "with the consequences described in [Richards]"),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968); Springer v. United States, 641 F. Supp. 913, 934 (D.S.C.
1986) (applying South Carolina law when negligence occurred in both North Carolina and
Maryland, because both states employed lex loci delicti and would therefore choose law of
South Carolina, where plane crash occurred), aff'd, 819 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1987);
Suchomajcz v. United States, 465 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania
law when it was unclear whether negligence occurred in New York or Pennsylvania, because
New York and Pennsylvania had identical choice of law rules that would choose law of Penn-
sylvania); In re Bomb Disaster at Roseville, Cal., 438 F. Supp. 769, 774 (E.D. Cal. 1977)
(observing that it was unclear where acts occurred which gave rise to strict products liability
claims, but finding that choice of law issue was mooted by parties' stipulation that applicable
state law would follow the Second Restatement of Torts § 402A (1965)).
138. Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1317.
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place of negligence dictates the applicable choice of law rules in FTCA
cases. If the place of negligence is unclear, then so is the determination
of which state's choice of law rules to apply. In some cases in which the
Government's negligence is spread among several jurisdictions, courts
have been nearly apoplectic in attempting to arrive at not only the cor-
rect internal law under the applicable choice of law rules, but also the
correct choice of law rules themselves.
139
The leading case on this issue is Bowen v. United States." In
Bowen, the plaintiff piloted a plane from Texas to Indiana with an inter-
mediate stop in Arkansas."' His plane crashed in Indiana because of
accumulated ice on its wings. 42 The plaintiff sued the United States be-
cause the FAA failed to advise him of icy conditions from various points
along his flight route. 143 Those points included Arkansas, Illinois, and
Indiana. 1" The district court applied Indiana law upon the mistaken
belief that Arkansas, Illinois, and Indiana each employed the lex loci
delicti rule, and thus had a "false conflict" as to their choice of law
rules.145 In fact, Indiana may have been the only one of the three to
follow lex loci delicti by the time the court of appeals decided Bowen, and
even that was in doubt. 146
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached
139. See, eg., In re Silver Bridge Disaster, 381 F. Supp. at 944-47 & n.18 (applying choice
of law rules from three different jurisdictions to narrow choice of internal law to two of them,
between which there was conflict on issue of damages but not on liability); Kantlehner, 279 F.
Supp. at 125-28 (applying choice of law rules from nine different jurisdictions to narrow choice
of internal law to two of them, between which there was no conflict).
140. 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
141. Id at 1314.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1313.
144. I1d at 1317. The plaintiff also alleged that governmental negligence occurred in Texas
and Kansas, but the court did not consider whether those states' choice of law rules applied
because the plaintiff did not argue the point. Id. at 1317 n.8.
145. Id, at 1317 & n.11; see supra note 128 for a definition of false conflict. If lex loci delicti
really bad been the choice of law rule for Arkansas, Illinois, and Indiana, thus creating a false
conflict among choice of law rules, the false conflict would have resulted in the application of
Indiana law under lex loci delicti, because that is where the plane crashed and the consequent
injuries occurred.
146. Illinois adopted the Second Restatement's "most significant relationship" test in 1970.
Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 45, 262 N.E.2d 593, 595-96 (1970). The Seventh Circuit
acknowledged this mistake by the district court, but seemed to think it inconsequential.
Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1317 n.l1. There also was some doubt as to whether Indiana adhered to
lex loci delicti at the time of Bowen. Id at 1319 & n.18. During the pendency of the appeal in
Bowen, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622,
550 S.W.2d 453 (1977) (en bane), in which the court applied governmental interest analysis to
a comparative fault issue. Id. at 629, 550 S.W.2d at 458. It was this decision that the Seventh
Circuit used to re-analyze the district court's choice of law. Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1317 & n.12.
FTCA CHOICE OF LAW
the same result as the district court, but by different reasoning. 147 A year
before the Seventh Circuit decided Bowen, the Arkansas Supreme Court
applied governmental interest analysis to select its own comparative neg-
ligence rule in an automobile accident case that arose in Missouri.
148 If
Arkansas's choice of law rule had applied in Bowen because some of the
FAA's negligence occurred there, then there was a chance that Arkan-
sas's comparative negligence rule would have applied as well. That
would have conflicted with Illinois's and Indiana's contributory negli-
gence rule. The Seventh Circuit thus had to decide for the first time
which state's whole law applied when the Government's negligence oc-
curred in more than one state. 149
Because of the FTCA's exclusive focus on the place of the act or
omission, the Bowen court eliminated lex loci delicti and the most signifi-
cant relationship test as choice of whole law approaches and narrowed
the alternatives to "[1] the place of the last act or omission having a
causal effect, or [2] the place of the act or omission having the most sig-
nificant causal effect."' 150 Like lex loci delicti, the former approach would
have the advantage of certainty.' The latter, however, seemed more
consistent with the FTCA's language and underlying purpose.5 2
Although the Seventh Circuit expressed a preference for the most signifi-
cant cause approach, 53 it ultimately did not have to decide the issue
because Indiana was the site of both the last and most significant cause of
the crash.' 54 The court then applied what the parties assumed to be Indi-
ana's lex loci delicti rule to select Indiana internal law and its contribu-
tory negligence rule.
155
The Seventh Circuit's somewhat improvised approach in Bowen was
the correct one. In the absence of Supreme Court specification in Rich-
ards of which acts or omissions govern the choice of whole law when
they occur in different states, the Bowen court selected the only two real-
147. Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1317.
148. Id. at 1317-18 (citing Wallis, 261 Ark. at 629, 550 S.W.2d at 458).
149. Id. at 1318 & n.14.
150. Id. at 1318.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.; cf Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 359-60 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that
situs of last negligent act might have been Virginia, where government nurse administered
rabies vaccine, but holding that actual administration of vaccine was "without significance to
[the] question" of where the act or omission occurred because negligence could not be attrib-
uted to nurse, and procedures for vaccination were formulated in District of Columbia). See
infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
154. Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1318 & n.14.
155. Id. at 1319.
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istic alternatives, and indicated a preference for the better of those two
choices. The simplest way to subdue the multiple place of negligence
dilemma would indeed be to choose the law of the place where the last
negligent act or omission occurred that proximately caused the FTCA
plaintiff's injury. The simplicity of the "last negligent cause" analysis,
however, is countermanded by the possibility that the last negligent act
or omission is an insubstantial cause of the injury, at least relative to
other causes. In Hitchcock v. United States,156 for example, the last neg-
ligent act occurred in Virginia, where a government nurse, untrained in
proper vaccination procedures, administered a rabies vaccine. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
"that the relevant 'act or omission' occurred in the District of Columbia
[where the United States formulated procedures for administering the
vaccine]. That the vaccine was actually administered in Virginia is with-
out significance to this question."15 7 Thus, the last negligent act or omis-
sion approach is convenient but substantively unhelpful.
Conversely, the most significant cause approach comports more
with the substantive purpose of the FTCA's "act or omission" language,
but it is often difficult to apply in practice. This is especially true in the
early stages of litigation, when factual questions such as significant causa-
tion have yet to be resolved, but when courts often need to decide the
applicable law for purposes of motions.1
58
Nevertheless, in light of the importance Congress attached to the
156. 665 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
157. Iad at 359.
158. Compare Southern Pac. Transp. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (E.D. Cal.
1978) ("The evidence necessary to determine the negligence of the acts amounts, in effect, to
the major portion of the evidence to be presented during the trial. For that reason, it has not
been possible to reach even a tentative choice of law decision under the Richards test.") and
Kantlelmer v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 122, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) ("Since a factual issue
exists as to where the allegedly negligent acts or omissions occurred, it would be impossible to
determine the applicable law at this [Rule 12] stage of the proceedings.. . .") with Bowen, 570
F.2d at 1318 & n.13 (place of negligence usually can be determined from face of complaint).
In Bowen, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Inasmuch the legal quality of conduct alleged to have caused injury to the plaintiff is
not determined until the end of the trial, and the trier of fact must know which law is
applicable in order to make that determination, the statutory phrase 'the place where
the act or omission occurred' necessarily refers to the situs of conduct that is asserted
to be actionable, rather than the situs of the part of that conduct that is ultimately
determined to be actionable. 3
.In the unusual case in which there is a dispute over where that conduct oc-
curred, that fact issue would have to be decided by the trier of fact before it could be
determined which law to apply.
Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1318 & n.13.
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place of negligence as the place whose law would control, the most signif-
icant cause approach seems preferable to that of the last negligent act
method.'5 9 As previously discussed, many federal regulations direct fed-
eral employees to conform their conduct to local law.' 60 When that con-
duct occurs in more than one jurisdiction, it stands to reason that
Congress would want the local law of the place where the most signifi-
cant negligence occurred to govern federal liability for those acts.
When considering motions to dismiss a complaint for failure to state
a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 6 ' which should be based on the complaint alone,162 courts can
attempt to discern the most significant cause from the specific allegations
of negligence in the complaint. 6 ' If the location of the most substantial
cause is not readily apparent from the face of the complaint, the court
can request (or the parties may volunteer) material from outside the
pleadings which reveals that location."' When considering summary
judgment motions under Rule 56, it may be that discovery, especially
depositions of expert witnesses, will reveal the most significant cause of
the accident. In cases in which a dispute arises over where the most
significant negligent conduct occurred, this issue would have to be de-
cided by the trier of fact before the court could determine which law to
apply. 165
The problem with the multiple place of negligence dilemma is not
the Seventh Circuit's creative response to it. The problem is that there
did not need to be such a problem in the first place. The Supreme Court
forced the Seventh Circuit and other federal courts to engage in an often
difficult and confusing choice of whole law analysis in addition to a
choice of internal law. Although the court of appeals experienced rela-
tively little difficulty in Bowen because Indiana was the site of both the
159. See Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1318 ("[T]he place of the act or omission having the most
significant causal effect ... seems to us to be more consistent with the statutory language and
Congress' intent.").
160. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
161. That rule provides, in relevant part, "that the following defenses may at the option of
the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
162. If matters outside the pleadings are presented in a rule 12(b)(6) motion, the motion
will be treated as one for summary judgment under rule 56. Id. 12(b).
163. See Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1318 (stating that "the statutory phrase 'the place where the
act or omission occurred' necessarily refers to the situs of conduct that is asserted to be action-
able, rather than the situs of the part of that conduct that is ultimately determined to be
actionable"). For an example of a court using the allegations of the complaint to determine
the most significant cause, see Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
164. See supra note 162.
165. Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1318 n.13.
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last and most significant cause of the plane crash, other courts have not
been so fortunate. 16 6 The double choice of law problem has led some
courts to virtually ignore state choice of law rules in an effort to simplify
cases. 167  In one case, the district court applied the law of Tennessee,
where the plane crash occurred, under the assumption that Arkansas,
one of the places of governmental negligence, still followed lex loci
delicti, which the Seventh Circuit had clearly refuted in Bowen. 6 The
166. See supra note 137.
167. See Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1319 & n.18 (accepting parties' assumption that Indiana fol-
lowed lex loci delicti, although Seventh Circuit had previously held that Indiana followed
"most significant relationship" test); see also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 527 F.
Supp. 962, 966 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (discussed infra note 168 and accompanying text); Kant-
lehner v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 122, 125-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (creating and interpreting a
series of false conflicts).
In Kantlehner, the district court seemed intent on avoiding altogether the difficult choice
of law issues by creating "false conflicts" in both the whole and internal law of the relevant
states: "Since a factual issue exists as to where the allegedly negligent acts or omissions oc-
curred, it would be impossible to determine the applicable law at this stage of the proceedings
unless the need to make such a choice is obviated; i.e., unless the circumstances present a false
conflict." Id. at 125. The court then proceeded to interpret a false conflict in the whole law of
seven of the nine states where the Government's negligence occurred by construing their
choice of law rules to be lex loci delicti, so that each of the seven would choose the law of
Maryland, where the accident occurred. Id. at 125-26 & n.8. The remaining two states, how-
ever, had adopted a significant-contacts approach and would choose the law of New York,
which had the greatest interest in resolving the contribution claim at issue. Id. at 126 & n.9.
Next, the district court interpreted a false conflict between the internal law of New York
and that of Maryland, both of which would reach the same result for different reasons on the
contribution claim. Id. at 127-28. The court was thus able to avoid any choice of law that was
consequential to the case.
Further study of the seven jurisdictions described as following lex loci delicti reveals the
extent of the Kantlehner court's issue avoidance. As the court itself acknowledged, California,
one of the seven states that supposedly would have applied lex loci delicti, was at least in the
process of adopting a modem approach when Kantlehner was decided, if it had not done so
already. Id. at 126 n.8; cf Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 866-67, 264 P.2d 944, 949
(1953) (Traynor, J.) (characterizing survival action as procedural rather than substantive and
thus governed by law of forum, but adopting prototypical "interest analysis" by considering
facts that all parties were California residents and that decedent tortfeasor's estate was admin-
istered in California). Another of the seven, the District of Columbia, formally adopted inter-
est analysis less than two months later. Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577, 583-84 (D.C. 1967),
aff'd, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968). If California or the District of Columbia had had a
stronger interest than New York in resolving the contribution issue, or if they otherwise would
have chosen internal law different from that of New York or Maryland, there might have been
a real conflict among several of the nine states' internal laws, as there was among their whole
laws, and the court would have had to face a consequential and difficult choice of law analysis.
168. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 527 F. Supp. at 966. In that case, the district court distin-
guished Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977) (en banc), on
grounds that the latter case involved an Arkansas plaintiff, which warranted the Arkansas
court to pursue its governmental interest in compensating its domiciliary by applying Arkan-
sas's comparative negligence doctrine over Missouri's harsher contributory negligence rule.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 527 F. Supp. at 966. Unlike the facts in Wallis, there was no Arkan-
sas party to the plane crash in Insurance Co. of North America. In Bowen, however, there was
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choice of internal law under the modem choice of law approaches is diffi-
cult enough for most courts without multiplying their problems with a
choice of whole law as well. One way to take a layer of complexity off
the problem would be to apply the internal law of the place of negligence,
so that federal courts do not face the daunting prospect of choosing the
correct choice of law rules in addition to choosing the appropriate sub-
stantive law among numerous jurisdictions where the negligence
occurred.
IV. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE INTERNAL LAW APPROACH
Although the internal law construction of section 1346(b) would
eliminate the choice of whole law in the multiple place of negligence
problem, it does not relieve courts from the often onerous task of distil-
ling one place of negligence from several possibilities. Yet any construc-
tion of section 1346(b) would require such a determination, because there
can be only one "place where the act or omission occurred" controlling
applicable law. The stakes for this determination, however, are much
greater under the internal law approach because the place of negligence
is the exclusive determinant of internal law. Choosing one place of negli-
gence among several alternatives thus takes on enormous consequences
under the internal law construction of section 1346(b).
Nevertheless, the consequences are only slightly less significant
under the Supreme Court's whole law construction. Under Richards, the
choice of one place of negligence determines the applicable choice of law
rule, which in turn dictates which state's internal law applies. In other
words, the impact of the whole law interpretation of section 1346(b) is
merely one step removed from the impact of the internal law approach.
Yet that one extra step gives result-oriented courts an extra opportunity
to achieve their desired objective by using a discretionary choice of law
rule to choose internal law that is more favorable to their position. The
place of negligence dilemma thus provides such courts with two opportu-
nities to manipulate selection of internal law: (1) by permitting it to
choose a place of negligence that applies one of the modem choice of law
approaches instead of lex loci delicti, and (2) by permitting it to use the
modem approach to select an internal law that favors one side or the
other.
Even in the absence of the place of negligence dilemma and its
double choice of law, the Supreme Court's whole law construction per-
also no Arkansas party to the plane crash, yet the Seventh Circuit still recognized the possibil-
ity of Arkansas applying its own law under governmental interest analysis. See supra notes
148-49 and accompanying text.
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mits courts to manipulate results in the second way noted above, by al-
lowing them to use a modem choice of law approach (assuming one has
been adopted by the place of negligence) to choose the internal law that
achieves the desired ends. In practice, this has resulted in more and
larger awards for plaintiffs.169 That practice has done violence not only
to congressional intent in enacting the FTCA, but to the public fisc as
well. The "cost" of the whole law approach is thus quite literal; courts
have manipulated choice of law rules to award plaintiffs more of the tax-
payers' money.
The corresponding benefit of the internal law approach, of course, is
its comparatively neutral, impartial application of the law of the place of
negligence, which might favor plaintiffs in some states but the Govern-
ment in others. This approach spreads the cost of waiving the United
States' sovereign immunity, fairly compensating plaintiffs whenever the
state where the negligence occurs does so. When the state where the
negligence occurs appears not to compensate plaintiffs adequately, as ar-
guably occurred at the district court level in Guillory,1 71 then the plaintiff
is no worse off than if he had sued a private defendant and the law of the
place of negligence applied. The difference, of course, is that the plaintiff
would at least have a chance for a more generous law to apply in the
latter case, because the forum's choice of law rules might refer to that
more generous law. That is simply a benefit that Congress did not intend
to confer to plaintiffs bringing claims under the FTCA.
Another "cost" of the internal law approach is that it sacrifices the
flexibility that the Supreme Court deemed so precious in embracing the
whole law construction. After all, the internal law approach adopts the
169. See, e.g., Foster v. United States, 768 F.2d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1985) (choosing
Illinois law to permit plaintiff to recover pecuniary damages despite financial independence
from her parents immediately prior to their death); Butler v. United States, 726 F.2d 1057,
1066 (5th Cir. 1984) (choosing Mississippi law of damages over Government's objections);
Guillory v. United States, 699 F.2d 781, 784-87 (5th Cir. 1983) (choosing Louisiana law,
which, unlike Texas law, permitted recovery for love and affection in addition to pecuniary
loss); Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 359-61 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (choosing District of
Columbia law to permit recovery that Virginia law would have barred completely); Loge v.
United States, 662 F.2d 1268, 1273-74 (8th Cir. 1981) (choosing Arkansas law to allow recov-
ery that District of Columbia law would have barred completely), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944
(1982); Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d 257, 265-68 (3d Cir. 1973) (choosing New Jersey
law to permit plaintiff's recovery for gratuitous nursing services, which New York law would
have foreclosed); Reminga v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 445, 457-59 (W.D. Mich. 1978)
(choosing Michigan law over Wisconsin law, which would have "substantially limited" plain-
tiffs' recovery), aff'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980); Merchants Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F..Supp. 409, 419 (D.N.D. 1967) (choosing law of North
Dakota, instead of that of South Dakota or Minnesota, either of which would have limited
plaintiffs' recovery).
170. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of Guillory.
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internal, substantive law of the place of negligence without any possibil-
ity of having another state's law apply. The Court, however, directed the
flexibility of the whole law construction toward encouraging the develop-
ment of modern choice of law rules,17 not toward using those rules to
choose law more favorable to one side or another (at least not expressly).
It is up to the states, not the federal courts, to adopt more flexible choice
of law rules should they so desire. The FTCA does not call for flexibility;
it calls for the relative certainty of applying the law of the place where
the negligence occurred. Relative certainty is the benefit that correlates
to the "cost" of the inflexibility of the internal law approach.
Another downside to the internal law construction of section
1346(b) is that, like the whole law interpretation, it fails to treat the
United States like a private defendant in some situations. Yet the only
way the FTCA could treat the United States like a private defendant in
all cases would be to allow the forum's choice of law rules to prevail. 72
Of course, this approach would directly contravene section 1346(b)'s
mandate that the United States be liable "in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred." Because of that language,
no construction of section 1346(b) could treat the United States precisely
as a private defendant in all cases.
Of the several costs of the internal law approach, the whole law con-
struction matches most of them. Both require the choice of a single place
of negligence when there are more than one. In both, the choice of a
single place of negligence results in a significant impact on the ultimate
choice of internal law, although the whole law approach has a somewhat
diluted impact. Both the internal and whole law approaches fail to treat
the United States like a private defendant when the plaintiff sues in the
district where he resides instead of where the governmental negligence
occurs. 173
The only "cost" of the internal law approach that the whole law
interpretation seems to remedy is inflexibility. Courts certainly have no
discretion under the internal law construction of section 1346(b) to
choose the law of a state other than that where the negligence occurred.
The question is whether that is a disadvantage or an advantage of the
whole law approach. When the traditional lex loci delicti rule
predominated in this country, courts often tried to escape its conse-
quences with devices such as characterizing an issue of law as procedural
if they wanted the forum's law to control, and as substantive if they did
171. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1962).
172. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
173. Id.
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not. 74 When they eventually began to adopt some of the more modern
and flexible approaches to choice of law, they also lost the certainty and
predictability of lex loci delicti. As previously discussed, 175 Congress
never intended to give federal courts the discretion to choose internal law
other than that of the place of negligence. Instead, Congress opted for
the certainty and predictability of having the United States governed by
the rules of the place where its employees are negligent. This certainty
and predictability is a benefit that equals or outweighs any cost of
inflexibility.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
If the choice of law provision in section 1346(b) of the FTCA more
accurately articulated what Congress intended it to mean, it would au-
thorize exclusive federal jurisdiction only "under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable in accordance with
the [internal tort] law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred."'17 6 Similarly, if the corresponding sentence in section 2674 were
completed according to its intended meaning, it would read: "The
United States shall be liable.., in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances [would be liable
under the internal tort law of the place where the negligence oc-
curred]."' 177 Although the FTCA's actual language gave the Supreme
Court marginal latitude for its whole law interpretation, common sense,
legislative history, and the foreign country exclusion did not.
Even if the lower federal courts used the Richards rule to favor the
United States, as has happened on occasion, 7 8 the choice of law provi-
sion in the FTCA was never meant to favor either side. It was meant to
be applied blindly and consistently, so that the liability of the United
174. See, eg., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 866-67, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953) (Tray-
nor, J.) (characterizing survival action as procedural rather than substantive and thus gov-
erned by law of California forum); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 41-42, 172
N.E.2d 526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137-38 (1961) (treating Massachusetts' limitation on
wrongful death recoveries as procedural question controlled by New York forum).
175. See supra notes 64-91 and accompanying text.
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988) (bracketed language added to suggest intended meaning of
statutory language).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988) (bracketed language added to suggest intended meaning of
statutory language).
178. See, eg., Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435, 1445, 1450-51 (5th
Cir. 1990) (choosing Louisiana law, which permitted lower recovery than Texas law, to apply
to damages issue); O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 846-51 (2d Cir. 1984) (select-
ing New York law, which limited plaintiff's recovery to pecuniary damages, over Greek law,
which had no such limitation, although FTCA's foreign country exclusion might have im-
peded choice of Greek law).
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States would be determined "in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred," in the plainest sense of that lan-
guage. It is only fair that federal liability be determined by the law where
the federal employee's negligence took place, as Congress intended. The
simplicity of the internal law approach is preferable to the complexity
and opportunity for manipulation of the Supreme Court's whole law con-
struction. To avoid another thirty years or more of judicial confusion
and manipulation, either the Court should overrule Richards at its next
opportunity, or Congress should immediately amend the FTCA to add
the words "internal tort" between "the" and "law" in section 1346(b) of
the FTCA.
I
